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Last term, the Supreme Court issued an opinion that may alter the
longstanding debate on congressional delegation of lawmaking power to
administrative agencies. The case primarily concerned a federalism issue.
In AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,' the Court determined that the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and not the states, possesses
authority to implement the provisions of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 that pertain to local telephone competition2 Although this part of the
Court's decision is likely to generate significant commentary, a less
prominent part may have far greater significance.
In that part, the Court for the first time invalidated an agency
interpretation under the second step of the Chevron test Under Chevron,
courts evaluating agency interpretations of statutory provisions must
determine whether a provision is ambiguous, and, if so, defer to any
'I Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. I would like to thank
Michael Bressman, Rebecca Brown, Barry Friedman, John Goldberg. Marci Hamilton, Joan
Larsen, Ron Levin, Chip Lupu, Richard Pierce, Jim Rossi. David Schocnbrod. Mark Seidenfeld.
David Spence, and Nick Zeppos for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts. I also would like
to thank Amanda Frazier, James McCray, and Robert Strayer for their excellent research
assistance.
1. 119S.Ct721 (1999).
2. See id at 730. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court. reasoned that the Commission's
authority flows from a provision of the Communications Act of 1934 granting the Commission
power to "prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry
out the provisions of this Act." Id at 729 (quoting Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
§ 201(b) (1994)). That provision was amended to incorporate the 1996 Act. See id. (noting that
§ 201(b) of the 1934 Act was amended by the 1996 Act to include the provisions of the 1996 Act);
see also id. at 729 n.5 (same).
3. See id at 734-36 (invalidating the FCC's rule under Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC. 467 U.S.
837 (1984)).
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reasonable agency construction.4 In all prior cases reaching the second step
of Chevron, the Supreme Court had deferred to the agency interpretation.'
In this case, the Court invalidated one of the FCC's interpretations as
unreasonable.6 Moreover, it did so not simply for typical process failures
such as lack of sufficient evidence or explanation supporting the
interpretation, as lower courts had done in the past.7 Instead, the Court
invalidated the FCC's interpretation for more precise and provocative
reasons: The interpretation failed to contain "limiting standard[s]" and
allowed private parties to fix the content of the regulation.8
If this reasoning sounds familiar, it should. Almost sixty-five years ago,
the Court struck down provisions of a central piece of New Deal legislation
on analogous grounds under the nondelegation doctrine. The National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) delegated to the President substantial
authority to promulgate regulations stabilizing the economy. In Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan,9 the Court invalidated a provision of NIRA because
"Congress ha[d] declared no policy, ha[d] established no standard, ha[d]
laid down no rule" to guide the President's discretion in issuing regulations
under the statute.' ° In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States," the
Court invalidated another provision of NIRA for the same reason. 2 As
4. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (" [I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute."); id. at 843-44 ("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency
to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of
the statute by regulation .... Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular
question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of
an agency.") (citations omitted).
5. See Ronald L. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1253, 1261 (1997) (noting that the Supreme Court has never invoked the second step of
Chevron to invalidate an agency interpretation); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 1034-41 (1992) (collecting and analyzing Supreme
Court cases from 1981 to 1990); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron
Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 355, 359-60, 367, 376-77 (1994) [hereinafter Merrill,
Textualism] (collecting and analyzing Supreme Court cases from 1981 to 1991). Levin and Merrill
each note a possible exception, IRS v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 494 U.S. 922 (1990)
(Scalia, J.), which held that the agency interpretation was "not reasonable" because it was
contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. However, both conclude that the Court actually
resolved the case as a matter of statutory construction under the first step of Chevron. See Levin,
supra, at 1261 n.38; Merrill, Textualism, supra, at 377.
6. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 736.
7. See, e.g., Kidney Ctr. v. Shalala, 133 F.3d 78, 87-88 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding insufficient
or incoherent agency justifications).
8. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 734-35.
9. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
10. Id. at 430.
11. 295 U.S. 495(1935).
12. The Court stated:
In view of the scope of [the] broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions
that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes [of
fair competition under the statute] and thus enacting laws for the government of trade
and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered.
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Justice Cardozo commented, "The delegated power of legislation which
has found expression in this code is not canalized within banks that keep it
from overflowing. It is unconfined and vagrant ... .. Furthermore, the
delegated power was so unbounded that it enabled the President to exercise
his discretion by rubber-stamping regulations proposed by private parties."
The Court declared such private lawmaking "utterly inconsistent with the
constitutional prerogatives... of Congress.' 5 The Court never again
expressly applied the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a statute.
Iowa Utilities Board may be understood to revive the dormant
nondelegation doctrine. It did not cite Panama Refining or Schechter
Poultry. Nor did it mention the word "delegation." Nevertheless, it
undeniably invoked the principles that underlie those cases and are
traditionally captured by the concept of delegation: the requirement of
limiting standards and the prohibition on private lawmaking. But it did so in
a new way. Instead of striking down the statutory delegation, as it had done
in Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry, the Court upheld the
"promiscuous" delegation to the FCC. 6 It then invalidated the FCC's rule
for failing to supply the very limiting standards that had once been
Congress's responsibility. The Court effectively required the agency to pick
up where Congress had left off and to carry forward the lessons of the old
nondelegation cases.
By requiring the agency to limit its own discretion, Iowa Utilities
Board may be understood to endorse a persistent undercurrent in
administrative law 7 and, strangely, to presage a subsequent D.C. Circuit
decision that is drawing considerable scholarly attention." Although that
case differs from Iowa Utilities Board in many respects, it shares an
essential feature. In American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 9 the D.C. Circuit
also invalidated agency regulations for failure to contain administrative
limiting standards.20 The court invalidated the regulations under the
nondelegation doctrine itself. However, it applied a modified version of the
doctrine that, as in Iowa Utilities Board, required the agency to supply the
standards that Congress had failed to produce.
Id. at 541-42.
13. Id at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
14. See id at 538-39.
15. Id at 537.
16. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721,733 (1999).
17. See generally International Union v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 758-59 (D.D.C. 1971) (Leventhal. J., for a three-
judge panel); I KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE L.AW TREATISE 208-12 (2d ed. 1978)
(recommending administrative rather than statutory safeguards and standards to check agency
discretion).
18. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?. 98 MIcn. L REV. 302
(1999).
19. 175 F.3d 1027, modified in part and reh "g en banc denied, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
20. See id. at 1037-38.
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This Essay argues that American Trucking and Iowa Utilities Board
confirm the emergence of a new delegation doctrine that has the potential to
shift the terms of the current debate on delegation and democracy.2' The
new doctrine does not ask who ought to make law, which has been a central
theme of scholarly interest in the delegation area. Rather, it asks how (or
how well) the law is being made. Thus, it fundamentally alters the
traditional scope of delegation review by refocusing the inquiry on the
exercise of delegated lawmaking authority. In so doing, it reinforces a
certain conception of democracy. By requiring agencies to articulate
limiting standards, it ensures that agencies exercise their delegated authority
in a manner that promotes the rule of law, accountability, public
responsiveness, and individual liberty. Furthermore, it advances these
values without having either to prohibit delegation or to approve delegation
wholesale.
The new delegation doctrine also acknowledges and addresses an
inherent limitation in the prevailing judicial strategy for constraining broad
delegations-interpretive norms. Since the effective demise of the original
nondelegation doctrine in 1935, the Court has searched for ways to assuage
its abiding worry about broad delegations. It has turned, with apparent
success, both to clear-statement principles and to ordinary tools of statutory
construction under the first step of Chevron. However, such interpretive
norms are unhelpful in many cases. In particular, they are of little value
when Congress writes statutes to grant agencies policymaking authority to
the fullest extent. The new delegation doctrine offers courts a meaningful
tool for monitoring these types of delegations. Furthermore, it offers a tool
that is more respectful of administrative discretion than either interpretive
norms or the original nondelegation doctrine are.
Part I of the Essay sets forth the two views that dominate the current
scholarly debate on the relationship between delegation and democracy.
Part II discusses the use of interpretive norms to constrain broad
delegations and identifies an inherent limitation of interpretive norms with
respect to some delegations. Part III proposes a new doctrine that attempts
at once to fill the gap created by interpretive norms, to mediate between the
extremes of the scholarly debate, and to retain democratic values in the
administrative age. Part III then illustrates this new doctrine with Iowa
Utilities Board and American Trucking.
21. The label "nondelegation doctrine" does not quite fit the approach described in this
Essay. The term "nondelegation" connotes a prohibition on transfer of congressional lawmaking
authority to administrative agencies. The approach in this Essay permits the transfer of authority
but imposes constraints on the exercise of that authority. Interestingly, the Supreme Court has not
applied the nondelegation doctrine itself to prohibit the transfer of congressional authority except
in the two 1935 cases mentioned earlier, Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry.
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I. DELEGATION AND DEMOCRACY
Although the current scholarly debate on the relationship between
delegation and democracy has many complexities, it is composed at bottom
of two opposing views. One side of the debate argues that delegation of
legislative power disserves democracy and ought to be prohibited. The
other side contends that delegation furthers democracy and generally ought
to be respected. This Part explores the jurisprudential roots of the debate
and then turns to the competing claims.
A. The Judicial Framework
Concerns about the transfer of lawmaking authority to administrative
agencies originally found expression in the nondelegation doctrine. The
evolution of the nondelegation doctrine has been well-charted.' It began
with Article I, Section I of the United States Constitution, which provides
that " [a]Ul legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives." ' For almost two centuries, the Supreme Court has
understood these words to limit the extent to which, or the conditions under
which, Congress may delegate its lawmaking powers to executive or
administrative officials.
In the early cases, the Court articulated a factfinding or "contingency"
theory of delegation. Specifically, it held that Congress could condition
implementation of statutes on a factual contingency, and could delegate to
an executive official the authority to determine whether that contingency
had occurred. 24 During this early period, the Court also upheld a number of
22. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 132-36 (1997);
Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State,
89 COLUM. L. REv. 452,478-88 (1989).
23. U.S. CONST. art- I, § 1.
24. The Court applied its "contingency" theory of delegation in The Brig Aurora, which
concerned the Embargo Act of 1809. See Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, II U.S. (7
Cranch) 382 (1813). The Embargo Act delegated to the President the authority to suspend an
embargo on trade with France and Britain if he determined that those nations "cease[ll to violate
the neutral commerce of the United States." d at 384 (quoting Embargo Act of 1809. § 4. 2 Star.
604). The Court upheld the Embargo Act on the theory that Congress could condition
implementation on a factual determination-whether the European countries had terminated their
unfair trade practices-and could delegate this determination to the President.
In Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). the Court upheld a provision of the Tariff Act of
1890 on a similar theory. The Tariff Act authorized the President to suspend favorable tariff
treatment for nations that imposed on American products any -exactions and duties ... which he
found to be... unequal and unreasonable." Id at 692. As in The Brig Aurora, the Court found
that Congress could delegate the authority to determine whether a factual "contingency" had
occurred--that is, whether the duties imposed by foreign nations were "unequal or
unreasonable." Id. at 692-93. Such administrative factfinding power differed in kind from
legislative power to make law or set policy.
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statutory delegations on a "detail-filling" rationale. Specifically, the Court
found that Congress could delegate to an administrative official the power
to "fill up the details" of a statutory scheme.25 Article I was satisfied as
long as Congress retained for itself the responsibility for setting basic
policy. Interestingly, many of the statutes upheld under this theory
contained only vague legislative standards and allowed administrators
significant latitude to make policy.
The most familiar judicial formulation of the nondelegation doctrine
first appeared in J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,26 which
involved the Tariff Act of 1922.27 The Act delegated to the President
authority to adjust tariffs when the rates failed to "equalize ... differences
in costs of production."28 The Court acknowledged that the Act authorized
the President to go beyond factfinding and make discretionary economic
judgments.29 However, the Court upheld the delegation because it found
that Congress had set forth "an intelligible principle" to guide the
President's discretion.3"
In two cases decided in 1935, the Supreme Court applied Hampton's
"intelligible principle" for the first time to invalidate provisions of a statute
for impermissibly delegating lawmaking authority to an administrative
agency. That statute was the National Industrial Recovery Act, which gave
the President broad authority to revitalize the economy in the wake of the
Depression. In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,3 the Court invalidated
section 9(c) of NIRA.32 Section 9(c) authorized the President to restrict
interstate transportation of oil produced in violation of state law. 3 In A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,' the Court invalidated section 3
of NIRA, which authorized the President to approve "codes of fair
competition" proposed by private industry groups.35 As stated above,
neither section contained standards to guide the President's discretion. 36
25. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825). For example, in Wayman, the
Court sustained a legislative grant of authority to the federal courts to adopt their own rules of
process. Similarly, in Butfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904), the Court upheld a delegation
to an administrator to "establish uniform standards" for importing tea. In United States v.
Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911), the Court upheld a delegation to the Secretary of Agriculture to
promulgate regulations protecting public forests and establishing criminal penalties for violations.
26. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
27. 19 U.S.C. §§ 154, 156 (1994).
28. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 401.
29. See id. at 405.
30. Id. at 409 ("If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which
the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a
forbidden delegation of legislative power.").
31. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
32. See id. at 433.
33. See id. at 406.
34. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
35. Id. at 535, 551.
36. See id. at 538-39; Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 418, 430.
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Furthermore, section 3 was so open-ended that it permitted the President to
exercise his discretion by rubber-stamping codes written by industry
groups, rather than considering whether those codes comported with the
broad public interest underlying the statute." Thus, it effectively delegated
lawmaking authority to private parties.
Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry have come to represent the
high-water mark for the nondelegation doctrine. Although the Court has not
overruled them, it has not since applied them or the nondelegation doctrine
to invalidate a piece of legislation. It has entertained delegation challenges,
however.38 In each case, the Court has upheld the delegation on the basis of
vague statutory standards. 39 These cases plainly demonstrate the Court's
unwillingness to enforce the nondelegation doctrine.
Justice Scalia has offered an explanation for the Court's reluctance in
this area. Although the Court has not renounced the importance of the
nondelegation principle in "our constitutional system," it has
acknowledged the centrality of delegation in our modem government.'
Moreover, the Court has recognized that once some delegation is permitted,
"the debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a
point of principle but over a question of degree." 4' Furthermore, "the limits
of delegation must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent
necessities of [government]." 42  Because this determination requires
consideration of factors "both multifarious and (in the nonpartisan sense)
highly political," the Court has "almost never felt qualified to second-guess
37. See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 521-22. Participating industry groups had to be "truly
representative" of the industry, and "impose no inequitable restrictions on admissions to
membership." The codes were to be approved only if they were not designed "to promote
monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and [would] not operate to discriminate
against them." ld. at 522-23.
38. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). In Yakus. the Court considered the
validity of the Emergency Price Control Act, which delegated to the Office of Price
Administration the authority to fix prices during World War II. The statute contained few
standards constraining the administrator's discretion. It directed the administrator to promulgate
regulations that would effectuate the general statutory purposes, including the establishment of
"fair and equitable" prices and "the prevention of inflation and its enumerated consequences."
Id at 420-23. Although these standards were no less vague than those condemned in Schechter
Poultry, they sufficed to sustain the delegation.
39. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768-69 (1996) (upholding a delegation
to the President to define the "aggravating factors" that permit imposition of the death penalty in
a court martial); Touby v. United States. 500 U.S. 160 (1991) (upholding a delegation to the
Attorney General to add certain drugs to those listed in the statute, the possession or sale of which
would constitute a crime, on the basis of standards that require the Attorney General to consider
the levels of use of a particular drug and its impact on public health); Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989) (upholding a delegation to the Sentencing Commission to
"promulgate sentencing guidelines for every federal criminal offense").
40. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 415.
42- Id. at 416 (citation omitted).
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Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be
left to those executing or applying the law."
43
B. The Scholarly Debate
The Court's reluctance to enforce the nondelegation doctrine has drawn
considerable criticism over the years from the likes of Chief Justice
Rehnquist," Theodore Lowi,45 and John Hart Ely.46 Each for his own
reasons maintains that Congress must make the hard policy choices
underlying law rather than delegate such responsibility to administrators.
More recent scholarship builds on this criticism, incorporating insights from
public choice theory. Most notably, David Schoenbrod claims that
Congress uses delegation precisely for the purpose of avoiding
responsibility for hard choices. According to Schoenbrod, delegation
"allows legislators to claim credit for the benefits which a regulatory statute
promises yet escape the blame for the burdens it will impose, because they
do not issue the laws needed to achieve those benefits."47 Thus, Schoenbrod
contends, Congress deliberately enacts delegations to shift blame for the
burdens that regulation inevitably imposes on the public. 8 Moreover, he
claims that Congress delegates to avoid responsibility for administrative
action that favors organized interests.49 Worse still, Congress intentionally
structures its delegations to ensure that any administrative action (or
inaction) will benefit organized interests. It either delegates broadly and
pressures the agency to accommodate powerful interests," or it delegates
narrowly, burdening the agency with specific-and often contradictory-
goals and procedures, in order to delay or inhibit regulation that burdens
industry."
43. Id.
44. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981) (Rehnquist. J.,
dissenting); AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist. J.,
concurring in the judgment).
45. See THEODORE J. LOWi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY AND THE CRISIS
OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 125-26 (1969).
46. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
133-34 (1980); see also MASHAW, supra note 22, at 136-40 (discussing the Rehnquist-Lowi-Ely
attack).
47. DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES TIlE
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 10 (1993); see also Marci A. Hamilton, Representation and
Nondelegation: Back to Basics, 20 CARDOzO L. REV. 807, 821 (1999) (noting that delegation to
agencies avoids the national scrutiny that Congress receives); David Schoenbrod, Delegation and
Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 731, 740 (1999) (same).
48. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 47, at 10.
49. See id. at 9-12, 49-57.
50. See id. at 55-56 (offering the Agricultural Adjustment Act as an example).
51. See id. at 58-81 (offering the Clean Air Act as an example).
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In Schoenbrod's view, delegation violates principles of democratic
governance.52 He claims that democracy, in its most basic sense, requires
lawmaking "by the people"-that is, lawmaking by elected officials rather
than by unaccountable bureaucrats. 3 Of course, forcing Congress to make
the hard choices (that is, nondelegation) also tends to generate good public
policy-or lawmaking "for the people" -to the extent that it makes
members focus on the public interest when writing laws rather than on
maximizing their reelection chances." In addition, requiring congressional
responsibility tends to reinforce liberty to the extent that it prevents
legislators from enacting laws that interfere with individual rights absent an
important public purpose.5 In other words, legislators may be deterred from
enacting laws that interfere with individual rights in the absence of an
important public purpose, if they will be held accountable for such
decisions. Nonetheless, whatever function congressional responsibility may
serve in producing lawmaking "for the people," Schoenbrod remains
convinced that lawmaking "by the people" is the essential feature of a
democratic government.56
The other side of the debate, represented by Jerry Mashaw and Peter
Schuck, argues that delegation reinforces democracy." Mashaw maintains
that agency lawmaking promotes accountability because, among other
things, it is subject to presidential oversight.s According to Mashaw, the
President is more responsive to public preferences than Congress. The
President deals with issues that are national in scope and has no particular
constituency demanding benefits in exchange for votes. Schuck claims
that agency decisionmaking is more responsive to the public interest than is
congressional legislation. 60 Agencies, he states, often are the most
"accessible site[s]" for public participation because the costs of
participating in the rulemaking process are likely to be lower than the costs
of lobbying Congress.6 Furthermore, agencies often are "more meaningful
52. See Schoenbrod, supra note 47, at 732.
53. Id. at 756.
54. Id. at 740; see also SCHOENBROD, supra note 47, at 14-15.
55. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 47, at 14-16.
56. Schoenbrod, supra note 47, at 756-57.
57. See generally MASHAW, supra note 22; Dan M. Kahan. Democracy Schinoemcracy. 20
CARDOzO L. REv. 795 (1999); Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David
Schoenbrod, 20 CAREOo7O L. REv. 775 (1999). To a certain extent, this characterization
oversimplifies the work of Mashaw and Schuck in this area. Their work contains many nuances.
Their main focus, however, has been to defend broad delegation and administrative
decisionmaking against attacks from the nondelegation school. This Essay is not intended to
criticize Schuck or Mashaw. Much of their work has been in response to Schoenbrod, who has set
the terms of the current debate.
58. See MASHAW, supra note 22, at 152-56.
59. See id. at 152.
60. See Schuck, supra note 57, at 782.
61. Id. at781.
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site[s]" for public input because it is there that the real policy stakes emerge
and crystallize.62 Congress, by its nature, tends to deal in generalities when
writing legislation.63 Finally, agencies are often the "most effective" sites
for public participation because parties not only define the issues there but
actually educate the government on the nature of the problem.' Thus,
Mashaw and Schuck, taken together, argue that broad delegation promotes
accountability and public responsiveness. As a result, broad delegation
generally ought to be respected.
II. INTERPRETIVE NORMS
The Court, for its part, has taken a moderate position. Since 1935, it has
never overtly embraced delegation review. But it has not entirely repudiated
such review either. To the contrary, it has continued to identify and address
delegation concerns through means other than the nondelegation doctrine.
In the recent case of Clinton v. City of New York,65 for example, a plurality
of the Court invalidated the Line Item Veto Act as a violation of the
constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment.' The Line
Item Veto Act enabled the President to "cancel" certain provisions of bills
after signing them into law.67 Although the plurality said that the Line Item
Veto Act permitted the President to amend or to repeal law, in violation of
the dual constitutional requirements for legislative action, 68 it identified
what looked more like a delegation problem: The Line Item Veto Act
delegated to the President broad authority to determine the ultimate content
of law.69
Only certain types of delegations permit the Court to invoke the
requirements of bicameralism and presentment as an alternative method of
enforcing the nondelegation doctrine. For the majority of troublesome
delegations, the Court has resorted to a more modest approach.7" In




65. 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (plurality opinion).
66. See id. at 436-47.
67. See id. at 436-38.
68. See id. at 438.
69. See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget
Process and the Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 877-91 (1999) (explaining the
delegation concerns underlying the plurality's decision invalidating the Line Item Veto Act). But
see Clinton, 524 U.S. at 463-66 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
the Line Item Veto Act does not violate nondelegation principles); id. at 484-86 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (same).
70. The use of interpretive norms to constrain broad delegation is a more modest or minimal
approach because it does not require judicial invalidation of statutes. See CASS SUNSTEIN. ONE
CASE AT A TIME (1999) (discussing judicial minimalism).
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delegations in cases raising constitutional questions, and it has used
ordinary tools of statutory construction to restrict a number of broad
delegations in routine Chevron cases.
A. Canons of Construction
The Court has used clear-statement rules and the canon of avoidance as
surrogates for the nondelegation doctrine.7 ' These principles direct courts to
construe delegations in such a manner as to avoid raising constitutional
questions, absent an explicit congressional statement to that effect.' They
are closely tied to the nondelegation doctrine to the extent that they ensure
that Congress, and not just the agency, has considered and spoken clearly to
the constitutional issue.
Kent v. Dulles73 is an example. In Kent, the Court refused to construe a
broadly worded statute to permit the Secretary of State to restrict the right
to travel.74 The statute authorized the Secretary to issue passports according
to rules prescribed by the President.75 The President, in turn, granted the
Secretary the power to deny passports in his discretion.76 The Secretary
exercised that discretion to issue a regulation denying passports to members
of the Communist Party.77 The Court declined to interpret the statute as
delegating the power to pass the regulation, because such power would
raise "important constitutional questions." 78 Citing Panama Refining, the
Court indicated that it would "construe narrowly all delegated powers that
curtail or dilute [liberty interests] ... [where] Congress has made no such
71. For a discussion of clear-statement principles as surrogates for the nondelegation
doctrine, see Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron. 90 COLUM. L REv. 2071.
2110-15 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, Law and Adninistration]; and Cass R. Sunstein,
Nondelegation Canons (John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 82, 1999) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons].
72. The canon of avoidance may differ slightly from clear-statement rules. It instructs courts
to avoid interpretations close to the constitutional line on the theory that Congress would not have
intended such interpretations. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (noting that the
"canon is followed out of respect for Congress, which we assume legislates in the light of
constitutional limitations"). Thus, courts applying the canon of avoidance frequently dispense
with the requirement of a clear statement and simply presume that Congress considered the issue
and resolved it against the agency.
73. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
74. See id. at 130.
75. See id. at 123.
76. See kid at 124.
77. See id. at 117-18.
78. Id at 130. The Court expressly noted that
[w]e would be faced with important constitutional questions were we to hold that
Congress... had given the Secretary authority to withhold passports to citizens
because of their beliefs or associations. Congress has made no such provision in
explicit terms; and absent one, the Secretary may not employ that standard to restrict
the citizens' right of free movement.
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provision in explicit terms." 7 9 Thus, the Court used the constitutional clear-
statement canon to avoid a delegation that would impinge on the individual
rights of certain passport applicants.80
The Court applied a similar canon in National Cable Television Ass'n v.
United States8' to avoid an unconstitutional delegation of Article I taxing
power.8 2 The Independent Offices Appropriations Act grants agencies
authority to assess fees against regulated parties to cover their operating
costs. 83 The statute directs agencies to set fee levels in consideration of the
"direct and indirect cost[s] to the Government, value to the recipient, [and]
public policy." ' In the Court's view, this language, "if read literally,
carries an agency far from its customary orbit and puts it in search of
revenue in the manner of an Appropriations Committee of the House." 85
The Court did not ask for a clear statement concerning the scope of the
language.86 Relying on Schechter Poultry, it simply declined to read the
statute as raising a constitutional question. It declared that the statute
merely conveyed the limited power to impose administrative fees.87
In Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute (the
Benzene case),88 the Court used the avoidance canon to escape a violation of
the nondelegation doctrine itself.89 The Secretary of Labor interpreted the
Occupational Safety and Health Act to require regulation of airborne
carcinogen exposure in the workplace at the lowest level feasible."
Accordingly, the Secretary set exposure limits for benzene at one part per
million of air,9 even though the Secretary failed to demonstrate that
benzene exposure at all levels above that limit posed a significant health
risk.92 The Court rejected the Secretary's interpretation and required a
showing of significant risk prior to regulation:
79. Id. at 129-30.
80. The Court did not decide whether Congress could have authorized such a delegation. See
id. at 127 ("Freedom to travel is, indeed, an important aspect of the citizen's 'liberty.' We need
not decide the extent to which it can be curtailed. We are first concerned with the extent, if any, to
which Congress has authorized its curtailment.").
81. 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
82. See id. at 340-4 1.
83. See id. at 337-38.
84. Id. at 337.
85. Id. at 341.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 340-41.
88. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
89. See id. at 662.
90. See id. at 613 ("Wherever the toxic material to be regulated is a carcinogen, the Secretary
has taken the position that no safe exposure level can be determined and that § 6(b)(5) requires
him to set an exposure limit at the lowest technologically feasible level that will not impair the
viability of the industries regulated.").
91. See id.
92. See id. at 653-54.
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If the Government were correct in arguing that [nothing in the
statute] requires that the risk from a toxic substance be quantified
sufficiently to enable the Secretary to characterize it as significant
in an understandable way, the statute would make such a
"sweeping delegation of legislative power" that it might be
unconstitutional under the Court's reasoning in [Schechter Poultry
and Panama Refining]. A construction of the statute that avoids this
kind of open-ended grant should certainly be favored.93
B. Ordinary Tools of Statutory Construction: Chevron
The Court has used statutory construction in a yet more subtle way to
preserve the nondelegation doctrine. Congress frequently delegates
significant policymaking authority to agencies by allowing them to interpret
or "fill gaps" in the statutes they administer. In Chevron, U.SA. v.
NRDC,9 the Court instructed federal courts to defer to reasonable agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms.9" The Court devised a two-
step process for determining when deference is appropriate." The first
inquiry (Step I) is whether the statutory provision at issue is ambiguous-
that is, whether Congress has spoken to the precise issue or has left a gap
for the agency to fill.97 If the meaning of a statutory command is clear, then
that meaning controls.98 If, however, the command is ambiguous, the
second question (Step II) is whether the agency's interpretation is
permissible or reasonable. 99 Chevron purports to give agencies great
discretion in interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions."'
However, the Court frequently finds clarity in ambiguity in order to
deprive an agency of discretion.'' The Court's efforts to find clarity where
93. Id. at 646 (citations omitted).
94. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
95. The Court said:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation
of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation.... Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular
question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.
Id. at 843-44.
96. See id. at 842.
97. See id. at 842-43.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 843.
100. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmnaking
in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REv. 83, 96 (1994) ("The deferential
courts' strong reading of Chevron essentially transfers the primary responsibility for interpreting
regulatory statutes from the courts to the agency authorized to administer the statute.").
101. See Schuck, supra note 57, at 788 ("Although it is true that the Chevron doctrine in
principle increases the deference to agency interpretations of their governing statutes, many
commentators have observed that the courts can, and often do. manipulate this doctrine in order to
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none exists, while perhaps not faithful applications of Chevron, are
nonetheless understandable as a form of nondelegation review. By denying
agencies the discretion to interpret ambiguous terms as they see fit, the
Court effectively may block the delegation of policymaking authority.
Textualists, like Justice Scalia, have proven notoriously successful at
extracting clear legislative intent from seemingly murky language when
they dislike a particular agency interpretation or the delegation of
interpretive power itself:
One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is
apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws,
thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron
deference exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require
me to accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would
not personally adopt. Contrariwise, one who abhors a "plain
meaning" rule, and is willing to permit the apparent meaning of a
statute to be impeached by the legislative history, will more
frequently find agency-liberating ambiguity, and will discern a
much broader range of "reasonable" interpretation that the agency
may adopt and to which the courts must pay deference. The
frequency with which Chevron will require that judge to accept an
interpretation he thinks wrong is infinitely greater."
Thus, Justice Scalia has admitted to successfully avoiding Chevron
deference in a variety of cases. 3
preserve much of their influence over agency decisions .... "); Peter L. Strauss, On
Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 429, 496 ("Justice
Scalia accepts broad delegations only because he cannot imagine a judicially manageable standard
for telling the good from the bad, a handicap he does not face if he can plausibly construe an
agency's authority in a narrow way.").
102. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 521.
103. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. 687. 736 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("There is neither textual support for, nor even evidence of congressional
consideration of, the radically different disposition contained in the regulation that the Court
sustains."); Maislin Indus. v. Primary Steel, 497 U.S. 116, 136-38 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(refusing to accord deference to the Interstate Commerce Commission's interpretation of
"reasonable" as used in the Interstate Commerce Act, stating that "under no sensible construction
of that term could it consist of failing to do what the statute explicitly prohibits doing-viz.,
charging or receiving a rate different from the rate specified in a tariff." (citation omitted)); INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-55 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Since the Court quite
rightly concludes that the INS's interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the plain meaning of
that phrase and the structure of the Act ... there is simply no need and thus no justification for a
discussion of whether the interpretation is entitled to deference." ).
Textualism may not always produce a determinate interpretation. It provides little help in
cases where the text evinces no congressional intent with respect to a particular ambiguity except
the intent to delegate interpretive authority to an administrative official. It also has limitations
when the language permits more than one plausible meaning. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 856 (1992) (remarking that
more than one plausible meaning entails potentially inconsistent results, thus defeating the
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Justice Stevens, though no textualist, also has failed to find "agency-
liberating ambiguity" when displeased with an agency interpretation. For
example, in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,'" Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, rejected the INS's statutory interpretation of the words "well-
founded fear of persecution" as flatly wrong."s The interpretation
concerned the showing that an alien must make under the Immigration and
Nationality Act to qualify for a discretionary grant of asylum from the
Attorney General.C6 The INS interpreted the phrase to have the same
meaning as the mandatory-asylum provision of the statute, which prohibited
deportation of any alien who showed a " clear probability of
persecution." "o1 Acknowledging that "[(t]here is obviously some ambiguity
in a term like 'well-founded fear,"' "os Justice Stevens nevertheless refused
to defer to the INS's construction.109 According to him, text and legislative
history made it plain that the term, whatever its meaning, was not identical
to its mandatory counterpart."'
Justice Scalia concurred, finding the meaning of the term clear and
contrary to the INS's interpretation on the basis of text alone."' But he
chided the majority for its inconsistent application of Chevron. Courts, he
said, may not "substitute their interpretation of a statute for that of an
agency whenever, '[e]mploying traditional tools of statutory construction,'
they are able to reach a conclusion as to the proper interpretation of the
reasonable expectations of those originally involved in enacting the statute). In such cases, resort
to other tools such as legislative history may prove necessary. See id. at 856-61 (observing that
using legislative history prevents incompatible and, therefore, undesirable results); Daniel A.
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L REv. 423, 457-58
(1988) (arguing that "legislative intent deserves a place in the interpretive effort"); Patricia M.
Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of the Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-
89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 301 (1990) ("When a
statute comes before me to be interpreted, I want first and foremost to get the interpretation right.
By that, I mean simply this: I want to advance rather than impede or fnstrate the will of
Congress. To that extent, at least, I am a conservative judge-Congress makes the laws. I try to
enforce them as Congress meant them to be enforced. To do this, however. I very often find it not
only helpful but necessary to consult the legislative history of statutes."). Furthermore, Thomas
Merrill has found that most Chevron cases decided by the Supreme Court involve textual
ambiguities. See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 5, at 369-70 (concluding on the basis of empirical
study that legislative history does not necessarily expand possible interpretive meanings of
statutory terms). Thus, Merrill has questioned whether Justice Scalia is correct in assuming that
textualism will yield firm answers more often than legislative history or reduce the occurrence of
Chevron deference. See id. at 370.
104. 480U.S.at421.
105. Id at 430.
106. See id at 427-28 (noting that § 208(a) of the Immigration Act authorizes the Attorney
General, in his discretion, to grant asylum to an alien who is unable or unwilling to return to his
home country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion").
107. Id. at 430.
108. Id. at448.
109. See id. at 448-50.
110. Seeid. at448.
111. See id. at 452-75 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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statute." 112 This approach, he remarked, "would make deference a doctrine
of desperation, authorizing courts to defer only if they would otherwise be
unable to construe the enactment at issue." ' 3 Once courts concede
ambiguity, Justice Scalia commented, they are obligated to defer."4
Justice Stevens refused, however, to construe the ambiguity to give the
INS power to adopt its interpretation. For Justice Stevens, "[t]he question
whether Congress intended the two standards to be identical [was] a pure
question of statutory construction for the courts to decide." '" In other
words, Justice Stevens refused to find that Congress had granted the INS
authority to resolve the question. Rather, Congress had left the task of
defining the standards to the courts. Any ambiguity the text contained
merely empowered the INS to apply the standards "to a particular set of
facts." 16 Thus Justice Stevens parsed the delegation implicit in the
ambiguous language. This parsing worked as surely as textualism to
constrain the agency's authority.
As the above cases illustrate, interpretive norms have allowed the Court
to address its persistent concern about broad delegations without requiring
it to invalidate statutes."' Cass Sunstein recently has encouraged courts to
continue this practice rather than attempt to revive the original
112. Id. at 454 (alteration in original).
113. Id.
114. See id. at 453-54. Interestingly, this is not what Justice Scalia did upon conceding
ambiguity in Iowa Utilities Board. Rather, Justice Scalia invalidated the FCC's interpretation of
the ambiguous words "necessary" and "impair" for failure to contain limiting standards and for
effectively permitting one set of regulated parties to make law. See AT&T Corp, v. Iowa Utils.
Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 734-36 (1999).
115. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446.
116. Id. at 448; see also Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of
Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron's Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 262-64 (1988) (proposing that
courts defer to agency interpretations that apply statutory terms to a particular set of facts but not
necessarily to those that simply define statutory terms).
117. Another case worth considering in this regard is MCI v. AT&T 512 U.S. 218 (1994). In
that case, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, invalidated the FCC's interpretation of the word
"'modify" at the Chevron Step I level. See id. at 225-28. Section 203(a) of the Communications
Act of 1934 requires communications carriers to file tariffs with the FCC, and "§ 203(b) permits
the FCC to 'modify' any requirement of § 203." Id. at 220. The FCC had interpreted the word
"modify" to allow it effectively to eliminate the tariff-filing requirements for MCI. See id. at 22 1,
224-27. Thus, it had interpreted the word "modify" to encompass basic and fundamental changes
to § 203. See id. at 224-27. The FCC argued that such an interpretation was supported by
Webster's Third New International Dictionary. See id. at 225-26. All other well-accepted
dictionaries suggested a less aggressive meaning. See id. Justice Scalia refused to find an
ambiguity based on the existence of one renegade dictionary definition, and rejected the
interpretation as contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. See id. at 228-29. Peter Strauss has
commented that Justice Scalia was motivated by delegation concerns. According to Strauss, the
diffidulty with the FCC's interpretation was not simply "the largeness of the change being
effected." Strauss, supra note 101, at 495. Other parts of the Communications Act grant the FCC
admittedly broad authority to make the most significant policy changes. The real difficulty in
accepting the interpretation was that it would have "entail[ed] accepting that an agency can be
empowered to change its mandate." Id. Justice Scalia construed the word "modify" narrowly to
avoid such a delegation of legislative authority. See id. at 496.
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nondelegation doctrine."8 The difficulty is that interpretive norms cannot
constrain all problematic delegations. Interpretive norms are useful in
addressing the nondelegation issue only when Congress's language fairly
allows such readings. Frequently, Congress chooses particularly broad
language to convey its intent to delegate lawmaking authority to the fullest
extent. This includes the power to determine all matters of subsidiary
policy, including appropriate limits on administrative discretion. In such
cases, interpretive norms (fairly applied) provide no mechanism to narrow
the delegation. They simply run out. Indeed, to apply interpretive norms in
such cases would frustrate Congress's intent. Clear-statement rules would
ask Congress to rethink a delegation that it plainly intended to make. The
other interpretive norms would allow courts to rewrite the delegation by
supplying the very limitations that Congress intended the agency to furnish.
Thus, interpretive norms are least helpful when arguably most necessary: in
the face of the broadest sort of delegations. The question is whether some
other doctrine might furnish a mechanism for counteracting or mitigating
wholesale delegations without striking them down in the now-disfavored
Schechter Poultry mode.
I1I. A NEW DELEGATION DOCTRINE
There is an approach that fills the gap created by the inherent limitation
of interpretive norms, giving courts a tool to police broad delegations that
Congress intended to make." 9 The approach, which has lurked beneath the
surface of administrative law,'" has come to light in recent cases.1 The
newly emerging delegation doctrine requires administrative agencies to
issue rules containing reasonable limits on their discretion in exchange for
broad grants of regulatory authority. Thus, the new delegation doctrine
upholds the congressional transfer of lawmaking authority to administrative
agencies, but imposes restraints on the exercise of that authority. Instead of
demanding intelligible principles from Congress, it permits agencies to
select their own standards, consistent with the broad purposes of the
statutory scheme. (Administrative limiting standards are distinct from
congressional intelligible principles because the former are not discernible
from the statute itself, but rather are chosen by the agency in accordance
118. See Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 71. at 2-3. 22-27.
119. This approach might even supplant interpretive norms by allowing courts finally to
acknowledge that such norms, as often applied. are inconsistent with general principles of
deference to administrative agencies.
120. See, e.g., International Union v. OSHA. 37 F.3d 665. 372 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 758-59 (D.D.C. 1971) (Leventhal, J.,
for a three-judge panel); 1 DAVIS, supra note 17, at 208-12 (discussing the development of this
practice by state courts).
121. See infra Section II.B.
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with the broad purposes of the statute. Both serve, however, to define the
parameters of permissible administrative action.) These administrative
limiting standards, once promulgated, function no differently than if
Congress had written them into the original statute-that is, they bind
agencies in implementing the statutory provision to which they apply.'22 In
this way, the standards serve to limit administrative discretion and prevent
arbitrary administrative decisionmaking.
Although easy to state, the administrative-limiting-standards
requirement, or more broadly, the new delegation doctrine, raises difficult
questions. The first question concerns the source of authority for the new
doctrine-that is, from where courts derive authority to invoke the new
doctrine and mandate administrative limiting standards. The second
concerns the reasons for preferring the new doctrine to the old doctrine-or,
more particularly, the extent to which the new delegation doctrine reduces
the substantial transaction costs imposed on the legal process by the
nondelegation doctrine. The final and most important question concerns the
relationship between the new delegation doctrine and democracy, or
whether the new doctrine can be justified from a democractic perspective in
a way that addresses both sides of the current scholarly debate.
A. The Source of Authority for the New Delegation Doctrine
The Court traditionally has understood the nondelegation doctrine to
flow primarily from Article I or the separation-of-powers principle.'23 The
nondelegation doctrine promotes separation of powers by forcing Congress
to make the hard choices rather than allowing it to delegate such
responsibility to the executive branch.'24 The new delegation doctrine does
not bear an obvious relationship to separation of powers. By tolerating
broad transfers of congressional authority to administrative agencies, the
new doctrine seems to concede any separation-of-powers objection. It
might be said that the new doctrine has an indirect connection to the
separation of powers to the extent that administrative standards serve in
122. See Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 284 U.S. 370 (1932) (holding that
agencies generally must follow their own rules until they are properly changed). Of course,
agencies may redefine the limits of their power or the regulatory theory under which they operate
as long as they sufficiently justify the change.
123. See AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672-74 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the judgment); see also Farina, supra note 22, at 479 n. 105 (noting that the Supreme
Court and commentators most frequently attribute the nondelegation doctrine to separation of
powers and citing SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THIE DELEGATION OF
CONGRESSIONAL POWER 24 (1975)); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State,
107 HARV. L. REv. 1231, 1237 (1994) (connecting the nondelegation doctrine with separation of
powers).
124. See American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. at 671 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment).
1416 [Vol. 109: 1399
Schechter Poultty at the Millennium
place of congressional standards to cure an otherwise unconstitutional
transfer of authority. However, it is fair to respond that, in the main, such
standards only replace congressional standards as a source of administrative
guidance. They cannot remedy Congress's failure to make the hard choices.
At most, they compensate for that failure.
The question then arises of where the new delegation doctrine finds a
basis in law. One possibility is the Due Process Clause. Concerns for
administrative discretion and arbitrary decisionmaking often sound in due
process." Indeed, lower courts have identified the Due Process Clause as
the source of authority for requiring administrative standards to cabin
administrative discretion.'26 Those cases involved delegations by state and
local governments to their own administrative agencies and therefore did
not present federal separation-of-powers issues. Nonetheless, the courts
found that the Due Process Clause supplied the requisite check on arbitrary
administrative decisionmaking. It may compel a similar result with respect
to federal agencies-at least those that receive power without congressional
limitations. 27
But courts need not rely on constitutional law to impose administrative
standards in such cases. Courts reviewing federal agency regulations have
the power to mandate administrative standards under the statute authorizing
those regulations or under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). For
example, a court reviewing an agency interpretation of an ambiguous
statutory provision might declare that interpretation unreasonable under
Chevron Step II unless accompanied by administrative standards defining
the boundaries of permissible interpretation."a In this way, the
125. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L REv.
1513, 1553 (1991) (inking the nondelegation doctrine to due process); Farina. supra note 22, at
479 n.105 (noting that commentators have linked the nondelegation doctrine to due process and
citing BARBER, supra note 123, at 11-13, 30-36).
126. For example, in Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964), the Fifth Circuit held
that the Due Process Clause required a city liquor-licensing board to issue a list of -objective
standards which had to be met to obtain a license." Id. at 610. In Holmes v. New York City
Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968). the Second Circuit held that the Due Process
Clause required the New York City Housing Authority to issue " ascertainable standards" for
awarding low-rent apartments. Id. at 265 (" It hardly need be said that the existence of an absolute
and uncontrolled discretion in an agency of government vested with the administration of a vast
program, such as public housing, would be an intolerable invitation to abuse."); see also Morton
v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 230-36 (1974) (holding that the Bureau of Indian Affairs must publish its
policy on denying benefits through notice and comment rulemaking "so as to assure that [the
agency's policy] is being applied consistently and so as to avoid both the reality and appearance
of arbitrary denial of benefits to potential beneficiaries").
127. But see Ernest Gellhorn & Glen 0. Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law. 75
COLUM. L. REv. 771, 792-93 (1975) (arguing that the Due Process Clause, as applied in Holmes
and Hornsby, only requires agencies to issue standards when allocating scarce governmental
benefits).
128. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 734-36 (1999). This application of
Chevron Step II differs from the application to traditional process failures, such as lack of
adequate explanation or evidence supporting the interpretation. A mere explanation will not
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administrative-standards requirement might be said to be implicit in the
agency's organic statute. 9 The requirement also might be understood to
flow from the APA, which establishes its own standard of judicial review
for agency interpretations and policy determinations. 3 Thus, a court
reviewing an agency policy determination might find that determination
arbitrary and capricious under the APA in the absence of administrative
standards. 131
In any case, the basic idea is the same. The agency rule is unreasonable
or arbitrary because it lacks a connection to some determinate theory of the
statutory provision it implements. Not only is there no assurance that the
rule is rationally related to such a theory, there is no guarantee that the
agency even has developed such a theory. Put differently, there is no
guarantee---or at least no outward indication-that the agency has assumed
responsibility for the hard choices underlying the statutory provision and
has limited its authority accordingly. This characterization reveals the dual
nature of the administrative-standards requirement. It seeks to confine
administrative action within reasonable and finite boundaries (so as to
prevent ad hoc decisionmaking), and it seeks to generate regulatory policy
that is both visible and consistent with the broad statutory purposes (so as to
produce accountable and responsive decisionmaking).
Whether constitutional or statutory in nature, the administrative-
standards requirement and the new delegation doctrine it supports compel
agencies to limit their own discretion in the absence of congressional limits.
But why resort to administrative standards to constrain arbitrary
decisionmaking rather than reverting to the original nondelegation doctrine?
suffice to sustain an interpretation issued in the absence of standards. Rather, the agency must
produce appropriate standards and demonstrate that the prior interpretation accords with those
standards. This requirement may prove more difficult to satisfy than the ordinary requirement of
reason-giving.
129. See id.; see also Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 758-59
(D.D.C. 1971) (Leventhal, J., for a three-judge panel) (finding the administrative-standards
requirement implicit in the agency's organic statute and inherent in the rule of law).
130. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994) ("The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."); id. § 551(13) (defining "agency action" to
include "the whole or a part of an agency rule"); id. § 551(4) (defining a "rule" as "the whole or
a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy"). Lower courts have displayed some confusion
over the relationship between Chevron Step II and the APA. The D.C. Circuit generally has found
that the arbitrary-and-capricious test of the APA and the reasonableness inquiry of Chevron Step
II establish equivalent standards of review. See Levin, supra note 5, at 1263-66 (collecting and
analyzing D.C. Circuit cases). Commentators have also urged a similar understanding. See Gary
S. Lawson, Reconceptualizing Chevron and Discretion: A Comment on Levin and Rubin, 72 Ct[i.-
KENTL. REV. 1377, 1378-79 (1997); Levin, supra note 5, at 1266-67; Seidenfeld, supra note 100:
Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 71, at 2104-05.
131. See Checkosky v. SEC, 139 F.3d 221, 225-26 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that the
agency's failure to provide an intelligible principle governing enforcement proceedings violated
the arbitrary-and-capricious test of the APA).
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From a practical standpoint, the answer is obvious. As the next Section
demonstrates, the administrative-standards requirement imposes fewer
transaction costs on the legal process.
B. The Relative Costs of the New Delegation Doctrine
It is first necessary to consider the costs exacted by traditional
nondelegation review. 32 Not surprisingly, the nondelegation doctrine
imposes significant costs on the legal process because it requires courts to
invalidate regulatory statutes or provisions. Thus, it embroils courts in
direct confrontation with Congress-a situation that the Supreme Court has
taken pains to avoid.'33 It also has destabilizing effects on the government,
the regulated parties, and the public. At a minimum, the uncertain future of
the regulatory program post-invalidation disrupts public and private
planning.' 3 Even the threat of judicial invalidation may have similar
effects.'35 Moreover, statutory invalidation calls for statutory reenactment.
Many commentators have highlighted the significant costs associated with
enacting and reenacting legislation. 36 A new bill (even one that revives a
prior law) first must compete with a slew of others for legislative attention,
and then must survive the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and
presentment. These obstacles reduce the likelihood that an invalidated
statute will be reenacted or reenacted promptly.
These obstacles appear with a vengeance with respect to invalidated
statutory delegations. According to public choice theory, legislators
routinely enact broad delegations to dispense with the need to reach
132. This Section primarily explores the costs imposed by the nondelegation doctrine from an
ex post perspective--that is, the costs imposed by judicial review of laws containing broad
delegations. For an explanation of the costs from an ex ante perspctive--that is. the costs
imposed on the initial legislative enactment process-see MASHAW. supra note 22. at 138. 148-
49; and Schuck, supra note 57, at 792.
133. Although the evolution of the nondelegation doctrine suggests that the Court seeks to
avoid such confrontation, the Court has not hesitated to confront Congress in other contexts. See.
e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417. 442-49 (1998) (invalidating the Une Item Veto
Act as a violation of the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment): City of
Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (restricting the scope of Congress's power under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (restricting the scope
of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause).
134. For example, when lower courts invalidate regulatory programs, the uniformity of
nationwide regulations is disrupted. See Peter L. Strauss. One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year:
Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Lintited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 1093. 1117-22 (1987). When the Supreme Court invalidates a
regulatory program, it leaves the affected agency, regulated parties, and the public in a state of
uncertainty as to whether, when, and how the program will resume.
135. See Schuck, supra note 57, at 792.
136. See MASHAW, supra note 22, at 14849: John F. Manning. Textualism as a
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. Rav. 673, 722-23 (1997); Schuck. supra note 57. at 792:
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-
Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295. 1305 n.41 (1990).
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consensus on contentious issues.37 In other words, they use delegation
precisely to reduce decision costs. When a statute or provision that relied
for its passage on a broad delegation is struck down, it is even less likely
than other statutes to be reenacted quickly. 3 8 In the interim, the status of the
regulatory program or part thereof remains uncertain. In some cases, the
regulatory program may not be reenacted at all. 39 Those who oppose
delegation (or big government) as a general matter might applaud this
result." ° Those who take a more moderate approach to the issue of
delegation might regret it. Included in this group are members of the pro-
delegation school as well as individuals who generally disfavor legislation
that avoids the hard choices but who might prefer such legislation to the
status quo in certain circumstances. 4 '
The new delegation doctrine reduces decision costs simply by avoiding
statutory invalidation and subsequent reenactment. However, it does
increase the costs of administrative decisionmaking by requiring the
adoption of administrative standards. Agencies traditionally have possessed
discretion in formulating standards.'4 2 Before the new doctrine, the absence
of standards (congressional or administrative) might have cost Congress its
delegation. After it, the absence of standards may cost agencies their final
rule and require diversion of scarce resources to reconsidering the same
issue. To prevent such a result, agencies may have to promulgate standards
whenever they perceive a potential lack of congressional standards.143
Furthermore, the new delegation doctrine anticipates that agencies will
issue standards through notice-and-comment rulemaking rather than
through less formal procedures or case-by-case proceedings. To prevent
effectively arbitrary decisionmaking in the dual sense described above,
administrative standards must be generally applicable, visible, and binding.
137. See MASHAW, supra note 22, at 142; SCHOENBROD, supra note 47, at 8-10.
138. See Schuck, supra note 57, at 792 (arguing that there are many obstacles to
congressional reenactment of a statute).
139. See id.
140. See id. ("Professor Schoenbrod might reply that ... if Congress could not enact the
more specific version of the statute, it should not be permitted to enact the less specific one.").
141. See MASHAW, supra note 22, at 142.
142. Agencies previously have been required to issue standards guiding their discretion under
certain circumstances. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232-36 (1974) (requiring the agency to
issue standards governing the denial of governmental benefits through notice-and-comment
rulemaking); Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968) (requiring
the agency to issue standards governing the denial of governmental benefits); Hornsby v. Allen.
326 F.2d 605, 608-09 (5th Cir. 1964) (same).
143. On the positive side, parties who devote resources to seeking administrative standards
(when those standards are genuinely absent) have some assurance that they will succeed.
Administrative standards are a necessary part of rulemaking pursuant to a broad delegation of
authority. Legislative standards, by contrast, are required only to the extent that lobbyists and
legislators persuade Congress to rehabilitate an otherwise invalid statutory delegation.
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Thus, they must take the form of notice-and-comment rules.' This
requirement not only consumes public and private resources but reduces
administrative flexibility-an important component in minimizing error
costs, among other things. There is considerable value in permitting
agencies to adapt their policies over time to informational advances,
technological innovation, and particular factual circumstances."' But there
is always a tension between the need for individualized or incremental
decisionmaking and the need for clear rules."4 Perhaps the best that can be
said in defense of the new delegation doctrine on this point is that Congress
strikes the balance in favor of clear rules by writing unbounded delegations
and creating heightened potential for arbitrary decisionmaking. Of course,
the alternative is to request further specification from Congress and to leave
agencies alone. But this remedy actually imposes greater costs on
administrative flexibility. At least agencies may alter their standards when
no longer appropriate in light of changed circumstances, provided that they
adequately explain the change. Statutory standards do not permit such
direct administrative revision.
On a more general level, the new delegation doctrine minimizes error
costs relative to the nondelegation doctrine by maintaining agency
involvement in policymaking. The Court and commentators have
questioned Congress's ability to specify competently the particulars of
complex regulatory schemes." 7 Congress, by its nature, legislates in
generalities because it cannot predict the ways in which its laws will apply
in concrete settings.'t As many have noted, the administrative process
offers a forum for crystallizing issues and gathering the input of interested
144. This may represent a significant departure from settled administrative law. The Court
has long held that agencies possess discretion to choose among statutorily authorized procedures
for decisionmaking. See SEC v. Chenery Corp.. 332 U.S. 194 (1947). The Court also has held that
reviewing courts may not impose additional procedures on agencies. See Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
145. In this regard, it is important to note that agencies need not adopt standards in a one-
size-fits-all manner. For example, the FCC might rationally determine that different standards
ought to guide its discretion under the same general statutory standard as applied to relevantly
different communications technologies.
146. See MASHAW, supra note 22, at 139.
147. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361. 372 (1989) (" [O]ur jurisprudence has been
driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society. replete with ever
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to
delegate power under broad general directives.").
148. See MASHAW, supra note 22, at 150-51 (observing that the Court's decision in Chevron
recognized "the uncertainties inherent in dealing with specific contingencies at the legislative
level"); Manning, supra note 136, at 725-26 ("No legislator, however prescient, can predict all
the twists and turns that lie ahead for his or her handiwork. The path of a law depends on diverse
and unknowable factors, and no one seriously argues the regulation of social problems can be
reduced to a pellucid and all-encompassing code."); Seidenfeld, supra note 100, at 118 (noting
that "members of Congress cannot possibly envision the myriad of real-world situations to which
the statute might apply").
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parties.149 In Schuck's words, the agency is "often the site where public
participation in lawmaking is most accessible, most meaningful and most
effective" 5 -accessible because the costs of participation in notice and
comment rulemaking are lower than those of congressional lobbying;
meaningful because the parties have the opportunity to define the precise
nature of the problem that the statute broadly addresses; and effective
because parties have the opportunity to educate the government about that
problem.' 5' In this respect, the new delegation doctrine has important
advantages over the nondelegation doctrine, which prefers congressional
specification to agency adaptation. It also has advantages over interpretive
norms (aggressively applied) to the extent that they substitute court
construction for agency elaboration.
The critical question raised by the new delegation doctrine, however,
does not concern its practical advantages. Rather, it concerns the
relationship between the new doctrine and democracy. More particularly,
the pressing question raised by the new delegation doctrine is whether an
administrative-standards requirement furthers democratic governance in
any meaningful way.
C. The New Delegation Doctrine and Democracy
The current scholarly debate might have difficulty making sense of the
new delegation doctrine in terms of democracy. Schoenbrod's side of the
debate might find that the administrative-standards requirement perpetuates
the general abdication of democratic values in this area because it fails to
ensure that Congress makes the hard choices. On the other side, Mashaw
and Schuck might conclude that the administrative-standards requirement
arbitrarily intrudes on democratic values because it interferes with the
legitimate exercise of administrative lawmaking authority. 2 Put simply,
one side might claim that the administrative-standards requirement does too
little, and the other side might contend that it does too much.
Whatever the merits of each side's argument, the entire debate falls
short of addressing the particular conception of democracy reinforced by
the new delegation doctrine and its administrative-standards requirement.
149. See Schuck, supra note 57, at 781.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 781-82.
152. Mashaw and Schuck do emphasize the role that judicial review and other forms of
oversight generally may play in constraining agencies. See id. at 783 (" [Wle should seek to assure
that bureaucratic power is checked and effectively bent to the legislative purpose, that the agency.
in Professor Schoenbrod's words, is not 'free to do as it pleases."' (citation omitted)); see also
MASHAW, supra note 22, at 158-65. See generally Schuck, supra note 57, at 783-90 (discussing
agency constraints). However, neither has addressed the possibility of a delegation doctrine of the
sort proposed in this Essay. See id. at 776 (" [If [the nondelegation doctrine] is not robust, there is
no point talking about it.").
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The new delegation doctrine does not focus on the proper locus of
lawmaking authority, which is the issue that has seemed to dominate at
least one side of the current scholarly debate. Rather, it accepts Congress's
assignment of power and consequent relinquishment of policy control. But
it does not thereby abdicate responsibility for promoting and protecting
democracy. Nor does it arbitrarily interfere with legitimate delegations.
Instead, it restrains the exercise of delegated authority by invoking a
principle-an obligation to provide limiting standards-that reflects classic
democratic values in precisely those cases that raise familiar concerns about
democracy.
This principle can be understood to advance democracy in several
ways. For example, it may increase congressional accountability by
improving congressional oversight of agency action.5 3 Administrative
limiting standards may enhance congressional oversight by providing an
additional piece of information for Congress to consider in evaluating a
controversial agency proposal."5 Moreover, that piece of information is
particularly useful to Congress in formulating a legislative response
because it provides insight not only into the agency's rationale but also into
its overarching regulatory theory.
55
153. See Schuck, supra note 57, at 785 (-Congressional oversight of administration is one of
the central pillars of the constitutional scheme of checks and balances .... ").
154. Administrative limiting standards also enhance presidential control of agency action, an
important (and, some say, superior) source of accountability. See MAsttAw, supra note 22, at 152-
56.
155. In this way, the new delegation doctrine may respond to arguments against delegation
posed by positive political theory and Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution. William Eskridge
and John Ferejohn have demonstrated that delegation disrupts the strong status quo bias built into
the Article I lawmaking scheme. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I.
Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. LJ. 523, 528-33 (1992). Their models, based on positive political
theory, illustrate the difficulty of achieving consensus among the House. the Senate. and the
President on any given piece of legislation. See id. Because the House, the Senate, and the
President have diverse preferences and priorities, they encounter considerable difficulty reaching
agreement on the proper movement away from the status quo. As a result, numerous bills fail to
receive either bicameral approval or presidential signing. Thus, they fail to alter the status quo.
Moreover, " [t]he Framers expected that such a legislative stalemate would not be uncommon, and
the requirement of bicameral approval [plus presentment] reflects the constitutional presumption
in favor of the status quo." Id. at 530. In other words, the Framers anticipated that the Article I
legislative process would promote stability and incremental change rather than sudden and
significant departures from the status quo. See id. at 532 (citing THE FPDERALIsT NO. 63. at 384-
85 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE FEDERAuST No. 78, supra, at 468-69
(Alexander Hamilton)).
According to Eskridge and Ferejohn, delegation dramatically alters this balance. See id. at
535-36. Statutes that delegate encounter fewer obstacles to passage. They do not require Congress
to make all the hard choices and thus evade the need for agreement by the two houses. They
confer considerable authority on the executive branch, and this transfer of authority increases the
likelihood of presidential approval. Moreover, they allow the President (or administrative
agencies) to exercise delegated authority in a manner that moves the status quo significantly
toward executive-branch preferences. See id at 536-38. In most cases, the President or agency can
move the status quo to a point just short of the level at which Congress would detect the change,
propose a bill responding to the change, and have sufficient votes to override any presidential veto
of that bill. See id. at 538-39.
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Administrative limiting standards also may spur calls for oversight
hearings. Traditionally, Congress has used such hearings sparingly and for
matters of some prominence.'56 Interest groups may increase the pressure
for congressional review of agency standards they dislike, either before or
after those standards are promulgated.157 Or interest groups, fearing
unfavorable administrative standards, may push for more precise and
protective standards in the initial statute. To the extent that this occurs, the
new delegation doctrine may force Congress to make more basic choices up
front-the result that Schoenbrod seeks to achieve through use of the
original nondelegation doctrine.
1. Rule of Law
Perhaps more significantly and intuitively, the new delegation doctrine
promotes the rule of law. As Jerry Mashaw succinctly explains,
A consistent strain of our constitutional politics asserts that
legitimacy flows from "the rule of law." By that is meant a system
of objective and accessible commands, law which can be seen to
flow from collective agreement rather than from the exercise of
discretion or preference by those persons who happen to be in
positions of authority. By reducing discretion, and thereby the
possibility for the exercise of the individual preferences of officials,
specific rules reinforce the rule of law. 
58
The rule-of-law rationale for delegation review is hardly new. It has
always been present in the Court's intelligible-principle requirement.
Although the Court has primarily understood this requirement to preserve
separation of powers, 159 it has made it clear that the requirement also serves
an important role in controlling administrative discretion.'"° Thus, the rule
By forcing agencies to adopt self-limiting standards, the new delegation doctrine increases
the possibility and quality of legislative oversight and hence legislative correction. Agencies (or
the President) may no longer enact aggressive policies in reliance on the high search and other
transaction costs that generally impede a legislative response. Cf. id. at 539-40 (arguing that
ordinary congressional oversight is insufficient to prevent an agency's preferences from reflecting
those of the President). Rather, they will have to select decisions closer to the House or Senate
preference points in order to avoid provoking a legislative response. This, in turn, will lead to
more stable and incremental change. Thus, the new delegation doctrine will, to some extent,
restore the Article I, Section 7 balance.
156. For example, in 1997 Congress held hearings on the EPA's controversial clean-air
standards. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Clinton Sharply Tightens Air Pollution Regulations Despite
Concern over Costs, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1997, at Al.
157. See Schuck, supra note 57, at 789.
158. MASHAW, supra note 22, at 138-39; see also Schuck, supra note 57, at 780, 783
(discussing the rule of law).
159. See supra note 123.
160. See American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104-06 (1946); J.W. Hampton.
Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406, 409 (1928): see also Yakus v. United States. 321
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of law has always supplied a partial doctrinal basis for the nondelegation
principle.
61
Moreover, the rule of law has furnished a major theoretical
underpinning of delegation review for some time. In his 1978 treatise,
Kenneth Culp Davis stated:
The purpose [of a nondelegation doctrine] should be to do what can
be done through such a doctrine to protect private parties against
injustice on account of unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary
power.
Instead of saying that delegations are unlawful or that
delegations are unlawful unless accompanied by meaningful
standards, the courts should affirmatively assert that delegations are
lawful and desirable, as long as the broad legislative purpose is
discernible and as long as protections against arbitrary power are
provided....
The change in the basic purpose is essential because the
underlying problem is broader than control of delegation; the
problem is to provide effective protection against administrative
arbitrariness....
... The courts should continue their requirement of meaningful
standards, except that when the legislative body fails to prescribe
the required standards for discretionary action in particular cases,
the administrators should be allowed to satisfy the requirement by
prescribing them within a reasonable time. 62
Thus, Davis understood the purpose of delegation review as advancing
rule-of-law values and further recognized that administrative, as well as
congressional, standards could serve those values. Davis certainly was not
alone on this point. As Judge Leventhal recognized in the important case of
U.S. 414, 426 (1944) ("Only if we could say that there is an absence of standards for the guidance
of the Administrator's action, so that it would be impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain
whether the will of Congress has been obeyed, would we be justified in overriding its choice of
means for effecting its declared purpose ...."); Farina, supra note 22. at 486 (noting that, after
Yakus, the nondelegation inquiry shifted to the question of whether Congress had supplied enough
policy structure to control administrative discretion).
Even the Schoenbrod-type insistence on congressional control and accountability contains
strands of this rule of law analysis: The greater Congress's own role in making policy, the greater
the assurance that structural limits on discretion will be observed. See SCHOENBROD. supra note
47, at 101 (noting that agencies often leave rules unspecified. which decreases congressional
accountability); Schuck, supra note 57, at 783 (" If the rule of law is a central goal (as Professor
Schoenbrod clearly thinks, although usually calling it 'responsibility'), then our desideratum
should not be statutes of a certain specificity with that level of specificity enforced by courts as a
matter of constitutional law.").
161. Of course, it is fair to argue that the separation-of-powers norm has always been present
to some extent in the Court's delegation cases. Furthermore, it is fair to question whether the new
delegation doctrine bears any relationship to that norm. See supra Section III.A.
162. 1 DAViS, supra note 17, at 208, 211.
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Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally,163 an administrative-standards
requirement "means that however broad the discretion of the Executive at
the outset, the standards once developed limit the latitude of subsequent
executive action." 164
Neither side of the current delegation debate has considered this precise
relationship between the rule of law and administrative standards. Because
of his focus on congressional responsibility, Schoenbrod has not even
considered the rule of law. 165 The rule of law accomplishes much of what he
seeks to achieve, however. Like accountability, the rule of law (as enforced
through administrative standards) tends to produce rational and responsive
lawmaking. Of course, it does so through different means and at a different
level of government. Rather than relying on congressional self-interest to
produce regulatory policy in the public interest, the rule of law-or, more
specifically, the new delegation doctrine that it supports-looks to
administrative self-discipline to generate regulation consistent with the
broad public interest underlying the statute at issue. But, as explained
above, this difference does not diminish the quality of the resulting
regulatory program. To the contrary, it enhances the quality of the program
by maintaining agency involvement in policymaking.
Schoenbrod might respond that the new delegation doctrine falls short
of attaining his central objective: to force Congress to make the basic policy
choices in order to prevent bad politics. He might oppose the new
delegation doctrine because it does not stop Congress from using delegation
to claim credit for superficial legislative responses while shifting blame for
unpopular results. The difficulty is that Schoenbrod's proffered solution,
the nondelegation doctrine, does not promise better results. As Mashaw has
noted, a Congress prohibited from delegating may use nondelegating
legislation to fool the public.' 66 The only sure way for courts to prevent bad
politics is to reform the entire legislative process by subjecting all
legislation to more stringent review. This proposition seems at once radical
and yet not so far-fetched in the wake of some recent Supreme Court
cases. 67 In any event, it goes well beyond the delegation debate. As
between the two comparatively modest approaches to the problem of
delegation, both admittedly leave room for Congress to mislead the public.
163. 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-judge panel).
164. Id. at 758. Of course, Mashaw and Schuck also highlight the importance of the rule of
law in agency decisionmaking. See MASHAW, supra note 22, at 138-39; Schuck, supra note 57, at
783. However, neither considers the relationship between the rule of law and administrative
standards.
165. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 47, at 100-01 (noting that agencies impair the principle of
congressional accountability when they leave their rules unspecified).
166. See MASHAW, supra note 22, at 146.
167. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (restricting scope of Congress's
power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995) (restricting scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause).
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But only the new delegation doctrine reduces the potential for arbitrary
decisionmaking-and thereby promotes democracy, broadly understood-
without disabling modem government.
Unlike Schoenbrod, Mashaw and Schuck acknowledge the importance
of the rule of law in evaluating broad delegations and accompanying
agency decisionmaking.' 68 They decline to elevate that value above the
others contained in the concept of democracy, however." As a result, they
might object to the new delegation doctrine because it gives precedence to
the rule of law over values like individualized justice and administrative
flexibility. 170 Admittedly, the new delegation doctrine imposes costs on
such values. However, as noted above, there is always a tension between
the need for clear rules and case-by-case decisionmaking."7 ' In the case of
broad delegations, it might be said that Congress tips the balance in favor of
clear rules. When Congress delegates authority without supplying
standards, it increases the risk of arbitrary administrative action.
Administrative standards are necessary to promote the rule of law, even if
they must come at some expense to other democratic values.
Mashaw and Schuck also might find the new delegation doctrine
problematic because of its potential for abuse by overzealous courts. The
argument is that courts will use the new delegation doctrine in an
antidemocratic fashion to target administrative regulations (or statutes) that
they dislike on policy grounds. Although this potential undoubtedly exists,
it cannot be judged in isolation or even in relation to an unenforced
nondelegation doctrine. It must be evaluated with respect to interpretive
norms, which reflect the modem judicial method for restricting broad
delegations. Interpretive norms grant courts significant latitude to displace
administrative regulations that they disfavor. As between interpretive norms
and the new delegation doctrine, Mashaw and Schuck have reason to prefer
the latter. Interpretive norms permit courts to substitute their own limiting
standards for administrative ones. To the extent that interpretive norms are
invoked in cases where the statutory language does not fairly permit (and,
arguably, even in cases in which the statutory language does), they
represent a far greater intrusion on administrative prerogatives than the new
delegation doctrine.
2. Private Lawmaking
Apart from enforcing the rule of law, the new delegation doctrine
serves another democratic function. It prevents private parties from
168. See MASAW, supra note 22, at 138-39; Schuck, supra note 57. at 780.783.
169. See Schuck, supra note 57, at 780, 783.
170. See MASHAW, supra note 22, at 139.
171. See id.
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effectively assuming lawmaking authority. Private lawmaking might be
said to result when administrators use open-ended delegations to rubber-
stamp regulations proposed by private parties. Broad delegations thus
facilitate private lawmaking because they contain nothing to constrain
agencies from adopting a wide range of options, including those developed
by one regulated party. A similar phenomenon was evident in Schechter
Poultry.72 There, the Court noted that delegations to private parties-
whether directly by Congress or through standardless delegations to
administrators-violate the basic constitutional structure, which requires
that government officials, and not private parties, make law.'73
In addition to violating the constitutional design, private lawmaking
impinges on democracy by prioritizing private gains over individual rights
and public purposes. Private parties have an incentive to select regulation
that provides them with maximum benefits without considering the effect
on the other regulated parties or the public.174 Thus, private lawmaking has
a tendency to produce regulation that both interferes with individual liberty
for suspect public purposes and inadequately reflects a broad public
purpose to justify such interference. In this regard, private lawmaking is
undemocratic even if it can be said to be efficient or rational on some other
grounds.
Private lawmaking, however, is often the product of insidious reasons
that, some argue, ought themselves to be prevented. It frequently is said that
interest groups pressure agencies to administer broad delegations on their
behalf' 7 5 Schoenbrod claims that private lawmaking actually originates in
the strategic use of delegation by legislators. According to Schoenbrod,
legislators deliberately enact broad delegations to help private interests
172. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935).
173. The Court stated,
[W]ould it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative authority
to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws
they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade
or industries?... And, could an effort of that sort be made valid by such a preface of
generalities as to permissible aims as we find in section I of title I [of NIRA]? The
answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law and
utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.
Id. In the statute in Schechter Poultry, Congress granted private parties an express role in
lawmaking on the face of the statute. The statute permitted industry groups to propose codes for
the President's approval. See id. at 535, 551. Moreover, the statute was so open-ended that it
allowed the President to exercise his approval authority in a perfunctory fashion, thereby giving
industry groups the power to make law. See id. This Essay does not restrict itself to statutes that
grant parties an express role in lawmaking. It also encompasses statutes that facilitate an effective
delegation of lawmaking authority to private parties by containing open-ended statutory language.
174. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 735 (1999).
175. It is debatable whether such pressure is problematic. See generally Einer R. Elhauge,
Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 35
(1991).
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capture the regulatory process.' Furthermore, they do so solely to improve
their reelection chances. Through delegation, legislators may satisfy the
interest groups that finance their campaigns. And they may satisfy the
voting public with superficial legislative responses to public problems
while shifting blame to the agency for any bad regulations."
To demonstrate his point, Schoenbrod offers the example of marketing
orders for navel oranges under the Agricultural Adjustment Act.7" The Act
was a New Deal effort to restore "order" to wildly fluctuating agricultural
prices. 79 In Schoenbrod's view, the statute actually was an attempt by
Sunkist, the largest orange producer, to stem the deleterious effect of
competition on its profits."s Congress sought to avoid the appearance of
capture by delegating broad authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to
issue marketing orders in the public interest.'' However, it took calculated
steps to ensure that Sunkist controlled the administrative process." 2 Among
other things, it continuously pressured the Secretary to allow Sunkist to
dominate the growers' committee drafting the orange marketing orderst"3
and granted bloc voting rights that enabled Sunkist to defeat referenda
amending or terminating favorable orders."'4 Thus, Congress guaranteed
that the Act effectively delegated to Sunkist the power to set sales quotas.
Meanwhile, consumers paid inflated prices and minority growers watched
as oranges produced in excess of the quotas rotted on the ground."t
In Schoenbrod's view, the orange experience demonstrates the pitfalls
of broad delegation. Broad delegation promotes capture by creating space
for political pressure at the administrative level. ts Furthermore, he claims,
there is no good reason for it. New Deal idealists believed that delegation
would insulate public-interest determinations from politics, facilitate
reliance on agency expertise, and increase focus on the public interest."a In
practice, Schoenbrod maintains, delegation enables legislators (and the
176. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 47, at 56-57 (pointing to the Agricultural Adjustment Act,
in which the delegation benefited a concentrated interest but ignored the public interest).
177. See i. at9-10.
178. See. at49-57.
179. See id. at 49-50.
180. See i at 4-6, 50-54.
181. See Ud at 50.
182. Members of Congress and the White House staff also acted to prevent threats to
Sundst's position from outside the administrative process. See id. at 51-52.
183. From the inception of the growers' committee, Sunkist held five of the 11 seats. In 1984.
the Secretary sought to reduce Sunkist's seats to four. After threats of political retaliation by
Sunkist, members of Congress and the White House pressured the Secretary to reverse himself.
See . at 50-53.
184. For example, in 1991, Sunkist exercised its bloc voting right to continue a marketing
order, despite bylaws that guaranteed members the right to cast their own votes. Without bloc
voting, the order would have been defeated. See id. at 54.
185. See id at 4.
186. See id. at 54-55.
187. Seeid. at 12-13.
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President) to influence the agency in private-which is more effective
because it is less visible. 8 Thus, delegation actually shields political
determinations from public scrutiny. And because delegation does not
achieve distance from politics, it does not take advantage of agency
expertise. 9 For these reasons and others, Schoenbrod argues that
delegation should be prohibited.' 90
Schoenbrod has not considered, however, the possibility of the new
delegation doctrine, which goes a considerable distance toward addressing
his concerns. Many of the failures that Schoenbrod identifies do not arise
directly from the transfer of lawmaking authority from Congress to the
agency; they arise from the potential for private lawmaking that the transfer
creates. For example, Schoenbrod's main complaint about the orange-
marketing-order statute is that it permitted Sunkist to dominate the
regulatory process. Sunkist used the open-ended grant of legislative
authority as an opportunity to pressure the Secretary of Agriculture to issue
and maintain orders that favored its narrow interests.' 9' The new delegation
doctrine prevents private parties from assuming regulatory authority. By
forcing agencies to promulgate limiting standards, the new delegation
doctrine bars private parties from dictating their own standards or
substantive regulations-assuming that those standards or regulations are
inconsistent with the broad public interest underlying the statute. Thus, the
new delegation doctrine frustrates attempts by private parties to capture the
regulatory process, but it does so at the administrative level.
Of course, Schoenbrod might respond that the new delegation doctrine
provides a less effective or certain mechanism for preventing capture than
does the nondelegation doctrine. For one thing, it may be difficult to
determine what rises to the level of private lawmaking. In this regard, it is
important to remember that it has been no simple exercise for the Court to
determine what constitutes impermissible delegation.' 2 Schoenbrod also
might argue that the new delegation doctrine does not prohibit Congress
from pressuring agencies to favor organized interests in less visible ways
than those exhibited in the Sunkist case. For example, the new delegation
doctrine does nothing to prevent Congress from pressuring an agency not to
regulate or not to enforce aggressively its regulations. In addition, it does
nothing to prevent Congress from constructing delegations to delay the pace
of regulation. Schoenbrod notes that Congress frequently writes delegations
containing complex and contradictory statutory "instructions" to the
188. See id. at 54-55; see also Hamilton, supra note 47, at 821 (stating that delegation shields
lawmaking from national scrutiny).
189. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 47, at 56.
190. See id, at 179.
191. See id. at 50-57.
192. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415-16 (1989) (Scalia, J.. dissenting).
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agency.' 93 According to Schoenbrod, Congress intends these instructions to
hamper the regulatory process and retard the issuance of burdensome
regulations.'"
The new delegation doctrine may offer no remedy for covert interest-
group pressure or delegations so narrow as to amount to no delegation at
all. However, this is not a reason to prefer the nondelegation doctrine.
Although Schoenbrod claims that the nondelegation doctrine may provide
some relief in this regard, Mashaw has noted that Congress may use non-
delegating legislation to enact interest-group deals or achieve regulatory
delay.'9" Thus, the nondelegation doctrine also has weaknesses in terms of
coverage. And, with respect to the cases it does cover, it lacks the
significant advantages of the new delegation doctrine. Only that doctrine
prevents agency capture-and thereby promotes democracy, broadly
understood-without imposing huge transaction costs on the legal process.
D. The New Delegation Doctrine Applied
This Essay began with a brief description of two recent cases. The first
was AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,'% in which the Supreme Court
invalidated an FCC interpretation under Chevron Step II for failure to
contain administrative limiting standards and for permitting private parties
to fix the content of law. 97 The second was American Trucking Ass'ns v.
EPA, 98 in which the D.C. Circuit invalidated EPA regulations under a
modified version of the nondelegation doctrine for failure to contain
administrative limiting standards.' 99 It is now possible to consider these
cases more fully as two applications of the new delegation doctrine.
1. Iowa Utilities Board
To understand Iowa Utilities Board in relation to the new delegation
doctrine, a fair bit of technical background is unavoidable. The case
involves the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which "fundamentally
restructures local telephone markets" by introducing competition among
providers of local telephone service." To facilitate competition, the 1996
193. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 47, at 58-8 1.
194. See id at 68-71.
195. See MASHAW, supra note 22, at 146.
196. 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999).
197. See id.
198. 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir.), nodified in part and reh'g en banc denied. 195 F.3d 4 (D.C.
Cir. 1999).
199. See at 1033.
200. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct at 726; see also Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L
No. 104-104, § 101, 110 StaL 56 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.A. § 251 (West Supp. 1999))
(introducing competition to local telephone markets). As the Court stated.
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Act prohibits states from perpetuating local-service monopolies and
subjects incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (LECs) to a variety of duties,
including the duty to share their network facilities with new entrants.2"
The Act establishes three methods for new telecommunications carriers
to enter markets for local telephone service. One method-" unbundled
access" -permits new telecommunications carriers to lease certain parts
of the incumbents' existing telephone networks in order to provide
their own telephone service to consumers.2" The Act directs the Federal
Communications Commission to determine which network elements the
incumbents must share with new entrants on an unbundled basis, The Act
further provides certain factors for the Commission to consider in making
this determination:
In determining what network elements should be made available
for purposes of [the unbundled access provision], the Commission
shall consider, at a minimum, whether-
(A) access to such network elements as are proprietary in nature is
necessary; and
(B) the failure to provide access to such network elements would
impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking
access to provide the services that it seeks to offer.2 3
The Commission promulgated a list of seven proprietary and
nonproprietary network elements that incumbent LECs must share with
new entrants.2"4 The incumbents challenged the list, arguing that the FCC
Until the 1990s, local phone service was thought to be a natural monopoly. States
typically granted an exclusive franchise in each local service area to a local exchange
carrier (LEC), which owned, among other things, the local loops (wires connecting
telephones to switches), the switches (equipment directing calls to their destinations),
and the transport trunks (Wires carrying calls between switches) that constitute a local
exchange network. Technological advances, however, have made competition among
multiple providers of local service seem possible, and Congress recently ended the
longstanding regime of state-sanctioned monopolies.
Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 726.
201. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(c)(3), quoted in Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 726.
202. The Act requires the incumbents to allow requesting carriers to "purchase local
telephone services at wholesale rates for resale to end users; ... [to] lease elements of the
incumbent's network 'on an unbundled basis'; and... [to] interconnect its own facilities with the
incumbent's network." 47 U.S.C.A. § 25 1(c). The Act on its face does not favor one method over
another; instead, it allows the requesting carrier to choose among the three options. Furthermore.
it imposes on the incumbents a duty to negotiate terms of access with new entrants and permits
these parties to arrive at mutually agreeable arrangements without regard to the obligations of
§ 251. But, if negotiation fails, either party may seek arbitration before the state commission
under the provisions of § 251 and related rules. See id. §§ 251, 252; Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at
726-27. With respect to the second "unbundled access" requirement, § 251(c) directs the
incumbents to provide such access "at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and
conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory." Id. § 251 (c).
203. 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(d)(2) (emphasis added).
204. Those elements include the local loop, the network interface device, switching
capability, interoffice transmission facilities, signaling networks and call-related databases,
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generated it without properly considering whether access to the proprietary
elements was "necessary" and whether lack of access to the nonproprietary
elements would "impair" the new entrant's ability to provide service, as
required by the 1996 Act. 5
The Commission stated in the First Report and Order implementing the
local competition provisions that
it would regard the "necessary" standard as having been met
regardless of whether "requesting carriers can obtain the requested
proprietary element from a source other than the incumbent," since
"[r]equiring new entrants to duplicate unnecessarily even a part of
the incumbent's network could generate delay and higher costs for
new entrants, and thereby impede entry by competing local
providers and delay competition, contrary to the goals of the 1996
Act." 206
Thus, it restricted the definition of "necessary" to consideration of
elements within the incumbent's network. " 7 It did the same with respect to
the term "impair." The Commission determined that lack of access to a
particular element would "impair" service if it would "'decrease the
quality, or increase the financial or administrative cost of the service a
requesting carrier seeks to offer, compared with providing that service over
other unbundled elements in the incumbent LEC's network,'-which
means that comparison with self-provision, or with purchasing from another
provider, is excluded."' Taken together, the FCC's interpretation of the
"necessary" and "impair" standards basically required incumbents to share
with requesting new entrants those elements that had the greatest effect on
cost and quality of service-that is, the most efficient and effective
elements-as determined by the new entrants. The incumbents argued that
the standards established "something akin to the 'essential facilities'
doctrine of antitrust theory," requiring access "only to those 'bottleneck'
elements unavailable elsewhere in the marketplace." 
2 10
operations support systems functions, and operator services and directory assistance. See 47
C.F.R. § 51.319(a)-(g) (1999). Requesting carriers may petition state commissions for additional
elements on a case-by-case basis. See i. § 51.317. On remand from Iowa Utilities Board, the
Commission revised the original list to exclude operator services and directory assistance and to
limit where and under what conditions the switching capability element must be made available.
See Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Implementation
of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, FCC 99-238,
(released Nov. 5, 1999), available in 1999 WL 1008985 [hereinafter Order].
205. See Iowa Utils. Bd, 119 S. Ct. at 727-28. The incumbents also argued that the list
included features that did not constitute " network elements" as defined by the Act. See id at 728.
206. Id. at 735 (quoting 1 283 of the FCC's First Report and Order).
207. See iL
208. See id
209. d (alteration in original omitted).
210. Id. at 734.
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Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, found the terms "necessary" and
"impair" susceptible of more than one interpretation: "We need not decide
whether, as a matter of law, the 1996 Act requires the FCC to apply [the
incumbents'] standard; it may be that some other standard would provide an
equivalent or better criterion for the limitation upon network-element
availability that the statute has in mind."' 1 Thus, Justice Scalia found the
terms ambiguous. In fact, he declared the entire Act "a model of ambiguity
or indeed even self-contradiction" that "can be read to grant (borrowing a
phrase from incumbent GTE) 'most promiscuous rights' to the FCC."' '
Congress, he suggested, had made this a Chevron Step II case: "Congress is
well aware that the ambiguities it chooses to produce in a statute will be
resolved by the implementing agency, see Chevron v. NRDC ..... " 213
Justice Scalia did not defer to the Commission under Chevron,
however. Rather, he struck down the FCC's interpretation as
unreasonable.1 4 In his view, the interpretation was fatally flawed because
the FCC had failed to supply any "limiting standard, rationally related to
the goals of the Act." 21 5 The FCC had interpreted the words "necessary"
and "impair" to require incumbents to share those elements in their
networks that would provide new entrants the best competitive advantage,
in terms of either cost or quality of service.2t 6 The Commission never
considered whether new entrants could obtain comparable elements or
comparable pricing from other carriers or supply comparable elements (at
comparable pricing) themselves. According to Justice Scalia, the
Commission's exclusive focus on the incumbents' networks deprived its
interpretation of any meaningful limit: "Since any entrant will request the
most efficient network element that the incumbent has to offer, it is hard to
imagine when the incumbent's failure to give access to the element would
not constitute an 'impairment' under this standard." 1 7
211. Id.; see also id. at 753 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The Act
expresses this last-mentioned sharing requirement in general terms, reflecting congressional
uncertainty about the extent to which compelled use of an incumbent's facilities will prove
necessary to avoid waste.").
212. Id. at738.
213. Id. (citation omitted). Justice Scalia did not expressly state that he was reviewing the
FCC's interpretation of the unbundled access provision under Step II. The citation to Chevron
came in a later part of the opinion. He applied Step II terminology and principles, however,
calling the FCC's interpretation not "reasonable" and describing the provision to which it related
as susceptible of more than one interpretation. See id. at 734, 736. Furthermore, Justice Souter
understood Justice Scalia to rest his unbundled access ruling on Chevron Step It. See id. at 739-40
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
214. See id. at 736 ("Because the Commission has not interpreted the terms of the statute in it
reasonable fashion, we must vacate [the interpretation].").
215. Id. at 734.
216. See id. at 734-35.
217. Id. at 735.
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The Commission attempted to justify its focus by arguing that "no
rational entrant would seek access to network elements from an incumbent
if it could get better service or prices elsewhere." 28 In other words, the new
entrants had already considered and rejected the possibility of obtaining
network elements from outside sources and of providing such elements
themselves. Because the new entrants already had determined that access to
the incumbent's network elements offered them the best competitive
advantage, it made little sense for the Commission to consider the
availability of outside elements.1 9
Justice Scalia conceded the point but said that this kind of reasoning
could not support an interpretation that "allows entrants, rather than the
Commission, to determine whether access to proprietary elements is
necessary, and whether the failure to obtain access to nonproprietary
elements would impair the ability to provide services."' Such an
interpretation, he suggested, impermissibly delegates to new entrants the
power to determine which elements the incumbents must provide under the
statute.2 ' He concluded that the Commission "cannot, consistent with the
statute, blind itself to the availability of elements outside the incumbent's
network."
As noted above, the Court identified two fatal flaws in the FCC's rule.
First, the rule lacked limiting standards. Second, it permitted private parties,
rather than the FCC, to exercise lawmaking authority.' The difficulties
identified in Iowa Utilities Board track those in Panama Refining and





222. Id. Furthermore, Justice Scalia stated, "'t]hat failing alone would require the
Commission's rule to be set aside." d Justice Scalia went on to find an additional reason to
invalidate the FCC's interpretation. In particular, he found that the FCC's interpretation, by
permitting the new entrants to select the most advantageous elements available, allowed them to
extract their desired profit from the market. See id. In other words, the FCC's interpretation
permitted new entrants to select whichever elements would guarantee them the highest profit.
even though some other element might enable them to compete effectively for the provision of
telephone service to consumers. See id. at 735 n. I1 I'c We similarly disagree... that a business
can be impaired in its ability to provide services ... when the business receives a handsome profit
but is denied an even handsomer one."). According to Justice Scalia. such an interpretation was
"simply not in accord with the ordinary and fair meaning" of the terms "necessary" and
"impair." Id. at 735. Justice Souter took issue with Justice Scalia's analysis. See iL at 739-40
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Justice Souter's view, Chevron permitted
the FCC to choose even an admittedly weak interpretation of the statutory terms. See id. at 740.
Justice Scalia responded by saying that the Commission's interpretation was more than weak. See
id. at 735 n.ll. It was unreasonable. See id. at 735 ("In a world of perfect competition, in which
all carriers are providing their service at marginal cost, the Commission's total equating of
increased cost (or decreased quality) with 'necessity' and 'impairment' might be reasonable; but it
has not established the existence of such an ideal world.").
223. See id. at 736-38.
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imagery from the latter case,224 calling the FCC's power "promiscuous." 225
Thus, Iowa Utilities Board can be understood in the context of the original
nondelegation doctrine and its case law.
More significantly, the case can be understood as an application of the
new delegation doctrine. The principal problem plaguing the rule was that
the Commission had failed to articulate a theory of the statute before
promulgating its list of elements. 26 In the absence of such a theory, the list
was fatally ad hoc or incomplete.2 7 The list also amounted to private
lawmaking-that is, lawmaking by the new entrants. 28 Assume for a
moment, however, that the Commission had determined, without relying on
the new entrants, that access to each element on the list was necessary
because denial would increase costs or decrease quality too much. The list
still would have left key policy questions unanswered-for example, how
much is too much under the statute? It was these unanswered questions that
created the potential for arbitrary decisionmaking and violated the rule of
law. Some governmental entity must make, articulate, and stick to the hard
choices underlying the statute.
But the case also raised the further problem of private lawmaking.
Recall that the FCC's rule "allow[ed] entrants, rather than the Commission,
to determine whether access to proprietary elements is necessary, and
whether the failure to obtain access to nonproprietary elements would
impair the ability to provide services."' 29 The FCC had permitted regulated
parties to define the terms of competition. In theory, this was more than
simply enabling the new entrants to secure access to particular network
elements. It was giving them the power to define the criteria that the statute
(or the APA or the Due Process Clause) required for all affected parties. Of
course, the new entrants effectively declined to produce such criteria and
instead generated a wish list of network elements. The FCC then rubber-
224. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935)
(Cardozo, J., concurring) (" The delegated power of legislation which has found expression in this
code is not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing. It is unconfined and
vagrant .... ).
225. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 738. Justice Scalia did not cite either Panama Refining
or Schechter Poultry, however. Nor did he mention the word delegation in reference to the FCC's
interpretation. In light of the Court's history in the delegation area, neither omission is particularly
surprising. The Court rarely mentions the nondelegation doctrine or the associated case law in
what are understood as modem delegation cases. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.
417 (1998); supra Section II.B (discussing the use of Chevron Step I as a delegation doctrine).
226. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 734-36.
227. See id. In this regard, the Commission did not simply fail to explain or justify its
interpretation. It failed to issue criteria guiding the interpretation of the statutory terms.
228. See id. at 735 (noting that the Commission's decision to "deliberately limit[ I its inquiry
to the incumbent's own network... allows entrants, rather than the Commission, to determine
whether access to proprietary elements is necessary").
229. Id.
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stamped that list. -30 Interestingly, there was no indication that the FCC was
somehow pressured to do so. It had adopted the list for what it believed
were perfectly rational reasons. "
Nonetheless, the Court rejected this type of lawmaking. Such
lawmaking not only failed to supply the requisite standards, but it also gave
regulatory power to those least likely to consider the interests of the
incumbents and the public. The new entrants had incentives to extract the
most advantageous terms for themselves, even though other terms might
suffice and better serve the broader statutory goals. 3 For example, free-
riding on the incumbents' networks or demanding excessive profits may
hurt service and prices in the long run, even though it would serve the new
entrants' own immediate interests. Justice Breyer's concurrence reflected
this concern.'
The Court determined that the Commission was not permitted to side
with the new entrants, because the agency was required to advance the
broad public purpose underlying the statute and to justify any interference
with individual rights by reference to such a purpose."35 In Justice Breyer's
words, "Regulatory rules that go too far, expanding the definition of what
must be shared ... to that which merely proves advantageous to a single
competitor, risk costs that, in terms of the Act's objectives, may make the
game not worth the candle."' The Commission was not obligated,
however, to accept the incumbents' position either: "[Ilt may be that some
230. The new entrants' involvement differed in certain respects from the private lawmaking
in Schechter Poultry. In Schechter Poultry, private parties received a role in lawmaking from
Congress on the face of the statute and received enhanced power from the President as a result of
an open-ended statutory delegation. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry v. United States. 295 U.S. 495,
535, 551 (1935). In Iowa Utilities Board, new entrants received their lawmaking authority from
the FCC, facilitated of course by an open-ended statutory delegation. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 119
S. Ct. at 735.
231. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 735.
232. See id at 735-36.
233. See id
234. Justice Breyer stated,
[A] sharing requirement may diminish the original owner's incentive to keep up or to
improve the property by depriving the owner of the fruits of value-creating investment.
research, or labor. And as one moves beyond the sharing of readily separable and
administrable physical facilities, say, to the sharing of research facilities, firm
management, or technical capacities, these problems can become more severe. One
would not ordinarily believe it practical, for example, to require a railroad to share its
locomotives, fuel, or workforce. Nor can one guarantee that firms will undertake the
investment necessary to produce complex technological innovations knowing that any
competitive advantage deriving from those innovations will be dissipated by the
sharing requirement. The more complex the facilities, the more central their relation to
the firm's managerial responsibilities, the more extensive the sharing demanded, the
more likely these costs will become serious. And the more serious they become, the
more likely they will offset any economic or competitive gain that a sharing
requirement might otherwise provide.
Id. at 753-54 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
235. See id. at 735.
236. Id. at 754 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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other standard would provide an equivalent or better criterion for the
limitation upon network-element availability that the statute has in
mind."237 The Commission was required merely to select some determinate
criteria that made good policy sense of the statute.
238
2. American Trucking Ass'ns
Iowa Utilities Board can be understood to illustrate the application of
the new delegation doctrine through Chevron Step II. The Court declined to
find the FCC's interpretation reasonable under Step II in the absence of
administrative limiting standards. American Trucking Ass'ns can be
understood to illustrate another possible application of the new delegation
doctrine-this time under the Constitution. Although the case purports to
apply the original nondelegation doctrine, it explicitly converts that doctrine
to one with the same procedural requirements, practical benefits, and
theoretical underpinnings as the new delegation doctrine. Thus, the label
"nondelegation" seems to be a bit of an artifact. However, it does serve to
indicate the constitutional dimension of the doctrine fashioned in the case.
237. Id. at 734; see also id. at 753 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The
Act expresses ... congressional uncertainty about the extent to which compelled use of an
incumbent's facilities will prove necessary to avoid waste.").
238. Of course, this requirement will not necessarily prevent the FCC or any other agency
from issuing substantive regulations that favor narrow interests. It may, however, impose a more
significant obstacle than the traditional requirement of reason-giving under cases like State Farm.
See Motor Vehicle Mfg. Ass'ns v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 462 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983) ("[Tlhe
agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made ...."). Indeed, upon
remand from Iowa Utilities Board, the FCC articulated standards that required it to revise its
unbundled-access rule. See Order, supra note 204, at 9-10. The Commission determined that
[a] proprietary network element is "necessary" . . if, taking into consideration the
availability of alternative elements outside the incumbent's network, including self-
provisioning by a requesting carrier or acquiring an alternative form from a third party
supplier, lack of access to that element would, as a practical, economic, and operational
matter, preclude a requesting carrier from providing the services it seeks to offer.
Id. Moreover,
[t]he incumbent LECs' failure to provide access to a non-proprietary network element
"impairs" a requesting carrier... if, taking into consideration the availability of
alternative elements outside the incumbent's network, including self-provisioning by a
requesting carrier or acquiring an alternative from a third-party supplier, lack of access
to that element materially diminishes a requesting carrier's ability to provide the
services it seeks to offer.
Id. at 10. The Commission further provided that
[i]n order to evaluate whether there are alternatives actually available to the requesting
carrier as a practical, economic, and operational matter, we look at the totality of the
circumstances associated with using an alternative. In particular, our "impair" analysis
considers the cost, timeliness, quality, ubiquity, and operational issues associated with
the use of an alternative.
Id. The Commission also set forth a number of additional factors that, consistent with the broad
purposes of the Act, it would consider in evaluating which elements to make available on an
unbundled basis. See id. Applying these standards and factors, the Commission struck several
network elements from its original list and added certain others. See id. at 11-14.
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American Trucking Ass'ns concerns a vaguely worded provision of the
Clean Air Act that directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
promulgate and periodically to revise the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS). 39 The EPA issued final rules revising the NAAQS for
particulate matter and ozone.2' ° For example, it reduced the ozone NAAQS
from a 0.09 parts per million (ppm) level to a 0.08 ppm level." ' In making
that reduction, the agency considered a variety of factors, including the
number of people exposed to serious health effects and the certainty of
those effects.242
Judge Williams, writing per curiam,243 invalidated the revised
NAAQS. 24 He took no issue with the factors that the EPA had employed;
he simply found them incomplete.245 According to Judge Williams, the EPA
was also required to articulate a theory for determining the point below
which the risks were too trivial or uncertain to justify regulation.2 6 In other
words, the agency was required to provide a limiting standard or
"intelligible principle" guiding its discretion:
[T]he only concentration for ozone and PM [particulate matter] that
is utterly risk-free, in the sense of direct health impacts, is zero.
Section 109(b)(1) [of the Clean Air Act] says that EPA must set
each standard at the level "requisite to protect the public health"
with an "adequate margin of safety." These are also the criteria by
which EPA must determine whether a revision to existing NAAQS
is appropriate. For EPA to pick any non-zero level it must explain
the degree of imperfection permitted. The factors that EPA has
elected to examine for this purpose in themselves pose no inherent
nondelegation problem. But what EPA lacks is any determinate
criterion for drawing lines. It has failed to state intelligibly how
much is too much.
24 7
Judge Williams remarked that it was as if Congress had asked the
agency "to select 'big guys,' and EPA announced that it would evaluate
candidates based on height and weight, but revealed no cut-off point." 24
239. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027. 1033. modified in part and reh"g
en banc denied, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Clean Air Act §§ 108-109, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7408-7409 (1994).
240. See American Trucking Ass'ns, 175 F.3d at 1033.
241. See id. at 1035.
242. See id. at 1036.
243. The per curiam opinion identified Judge Williams as author of this part. Judgc Ginsburg
joined, with Judge Tatel dissenting.
244. See id at 1034-38.
245. See id. at 1036-37.
246. See id.
247. Id. at 1034 (citations omitted).
248. Id
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The EPA was obligated to determine "How tall? How heavy?" 49 Its failure
to do so violated the nondelegation doctrine. Judge Williams remanded the
rules to the EPA for further specification consistent with the broad statutory
purpose of the Clean Air Act °50 He acknowledged that the nondelegation
doctrine ordinarily requires congressional remand-that is, statutory
invalidation." However, he stated,
[w]here (as here) statutory language and an existing agency
interpretation involve an unconstitutional delegation of power, but
an interpretation without the constitutional weakness is or may be
available, our response is not to strike down the statute but to give
the agency an opportunity to extract a determinate standard on its
own.
252
Judge Williams justified this approach by pointing to the practical
advantages of remanding for administrative standards. According to Judge
Williams, remanding to the agency "ensure[s] that the courts not hold
unconstitutional a statute that an agency, with the application of its special
expertise, could salvage. 2 53 There are two parts to Judge Williams's
observation: preventing courts from unnecessarily invalidating statutes,
particularly on constitutional grounds, and preserving a role for agency
expertise in saving them. The former reflects a concern to avoid the
transaction costs associated with statutory invalidation, and the latter
reflects a concern to capture the benefits of agency rulemaking.
The more important issue was whether the remand for administrative
standards would serve the purposes of the nondelegation doctrine. Judge
Williams conceded that his approach would not promote congressional
responsibility, because the agency would still get to make the policy
choices.2 4 But, he said, the Supreme Court no longer insists upon this
"strong form" of nondelegation review.255 Furthermore, he noted, his
approach would serve the remaining purposes of the nondelegation
doctrine: preventing arbitrary administrative decisionmaking and
249. Id.
250. See id. at 1038.
251. See id.
252. Id. In this regard, Judge Williams clearly determined that administrative standards were
constitutionally required in the absence of congressional standards. However, he did not clarify
the constitutional provision from which such standards emanated. As discussed above and as
Judge Williams acknowledged, see id., administrative standards do not bear an obvious
connection to the separation-of-powers rationale underlying the nondelegation doctrine. Perhaps
Judge Williams determined that they nonetheless flow from the separation-of-powers principle
because they serve in place of congressional standards to guide administrative discretion. Or
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facilitating judicial review. "If the agency develops determinate, binding
standards for itself, it is less likely to exercise the delegated authority
arbitrarily." 6 With those words, Judge Williams made explicit what was
only implicit in Iowa Utilities Board: that the administrative-standards
requirement furthers democracy broadly understood to encompass rational,
responsible, and responsive lawmaking.
Writing in support of the denial for rehearing on this issue, Judge
Williams also confirmed another point implicit in Iowa Utilities Board: the
inherent limitation of interpretive norms as an alternative strategy for
restraining broad delegations. 7 Judge Williams defended his decision to
ask the agency for limiting standards by invoking the principle of Chevron
deference. 8 Just as Chevron grants agencies authority to choose among
reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms, so it also grants
agencies authority to select among reasonable interpretations "of statute[s]
containing only an ambiguous principle by which to guide its exercise of
delegated authority." 9 Thus, courts should respect an agency's choice of
limiting standards and, conversely, should look to the agency rather than
Congress for such standards when absent. Furthermore, courts should not
impose their own standards under a clear-statement or Benzene-type
approach. 260 To do so would frustrate Congress's intent and contradict
Chevron. In short, courts should address delegation issues to the agency
under a modified form of nondelegation review-or, more aptly described,
under a new form of delegation review created expressly for the
administrative state.
IV. CONCLUSION
The new delegation doctrine might seem perplexing to both sides of the
current delegation debate. Either it is too intrusive on administrative
prerogatives or it is not nearly intrusive enough. The new delegation
doctrine is difficult to comprehend only because it evinces a different focus.
While the debate concentrates primarily on the legitimacy of lawmaking by
administrative agencies, the new doctrine speaks more to the goal of
promoting the legitimacy of law made by administrative agencies. It might
even be fair to say that, in this regard, the new doctrine moves beyond the
academic debate. Moreover, the new doctrine neither abandons democracy
256. Id.
257. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA. 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Unlike the original
per curianm opinion, the rehearing opinion does not identify Judge Williams as its author. It was
joined by Judge Williams and Judge Ginsburg, with Judge Tatel dissenting.
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nor interferes with it in an arbitrary fashion. It attempts to reinforce a
certain conception of democracy in precisely those cases that suggest a
classic democracy problem. And it does so at the administrative level,
preserving the significant advantages of agency policymaking. Thus, it
offers a mechanism that mediates between the extremes of the delegation
debate and that fits comfortably within the administrative state.
The new delegation doctrine also recognizes and remedies the inherent
limitation of interpretive norms as an alternative tool for constraining broad
delegations. Interpretive norms are helpful only where Congress's language
permits their application. With increasing frequency, Congress writes
statutes in language intended to convey maximum policymaking authority
to administrative agencies. In such cases, interpretive norms simply run out.
To apply them would allow courts to substitute their judgment of what
Congress should have written for what Congress did write-a broad
delegation that leaves to the agency the choice among reasonable limiting
standards. The new delegation doctrine respects Congress's delegation but
also ensures that agencies implement their delegated authority in an
appropriate manner, by supplying the standards necessary for democratic
lawmaking.
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